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Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate if there is a difference in the 
short-term announcement effects of equity private placements depending on 
the relationship of the investor with the issuing firms in terms of 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts. 
Methodology:  An event study is conducted to study if there are abnormal returns. The 
 abnormal returns will be used as the dependent variable in a regression 
 which allows us to include more variables of interest. 
 
Theoretical  Information asymmetry, information hypothesis, agency theory, monitoring 
perspective: hypothesis, managerial entrenchment hypothesis, signalling theory,  
 convergence-of-interest 
 
Empirical  59 Private placements issued in Sweden between 2009-2014 by listed firms. 
foundation: 
 
Conclusion:   We come to the conclusion that the investor type in a private placement has 
an effect on how the market reacts to the announcement of this issue. The 
announcement of an insider buyer results in a low positive abnormal return. 
There is weak support in our study that active buyers get the highest 
abnormal returns. The market reactions are therefore best supported by the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis whereas the information and 
monitoring hypotheses gain weak support. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This first chapter introduces the topic by explaining the background of the problem this study 
is based on. A detailed problem discussion and the identification of the research gap follows 
leading to the specific purpose and research question established for this study. A short 
overview of the limitations that set the frames for the data collection follows before ending 
this chapter with an outline, guiding the reader through the report. 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
In this thesis the short-term market reaction to equity private placement will be examined. 
Private placement is a sub-category to Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO). Private placements 
are defined as equity issues which target only a small group of current or new shareholders of 
a public firm (Molin, 1996; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). According to many studies the 
announcement of SEOs generates a negative stock price movement (Asquith & Mullins, 1986; 
Masulis & Korwar, 1986; Smith, 1986; Kim & Purnanandam, 2006). However, private 
placements generate a positive stock price effect as investigated by Wruck (1989) and Hertzel 
and Smith (1993). It is interesting that a sub-category of SEOs result in a different market 
reaction than SEOs in general. The positive effect to private placements is captivating because 
one would expect that the market reacts negatively to dilution effects and discounts to private 
placement issues. The research community explains the positive market reaction to private 
placements mainly with two hypotheses: the information hypothesis and the monitoring 
hypothesis.  
The information hypothesis is originated from Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection 
model suggesting that management has superior information about the true value of a firm. 
Under the assumption that insiders know more, they can conceivably make decisions for their 
advantage such as issuing overvalued securities leading to a negative stock price reaction to 
SEOs. Myers and Majluf’s (1984) hypothesis is later extended by Hertzel and Smith (1993) in 
the private placement context to the information hypothesis. They add that private placements 
help to communicate some of management’s private information. When a well-informed 
investor is willing to commit funds, it sends a positive signal to the market (Hertzel & Smith, 
1993). Wruck (1989) argues in the monitoring hypothesis, that private placement buyers 
monitor the management leading to reduced agency conflicts. When a private placement is 
purchased by an active investor, who is both willing and able to monitor management in order 
to make sure that the companies’ resources are used more efficiently, a positive market 
reaction is generated (Wruck, 1989).  
2 
 
1.2. PROBLEM DISCUSSION 
While the information hypothesis and the monitoring hypothesis are extensively investigated 
in the private placement context, Barclay et al. (2007) introduce an alternative hypothesis, the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis. This hypothesis contrasts the two others in terms of 
market reactions to private placements since it states that the market reaction could be 
negative. According to the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the management favors 
investors who do not want to get actively involved, allowing managers to solidify their 
control. As a result, the existing non-participating shareholders might be disadvantaged since 
the increased monitoring as argued in the monitoring hypothesis will not be realized (Barclay 
et al., 2007). The managerial entrenchment hypothesis introduces that the relationship the 
buyer has with the issuing company, could explain the different market reactions of private 
placements. As already mentioned, the monitoring hypothesis assumes that an actively 
involved buyer should generate a positive reaction. In contrast, the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis predicts a negative market reaction. Considering this, the relevant question is how 
the private placement investor’s relationship with the issuing company impacts the market 
reactions (Wruck, 1989; Barclay et al., 2007). 
1.3. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION  
The research on the private placement buyer’s relationship with the issuing company and its 
respective market reaction is limited so far. Barclay et al.’s (2007) study conducted for the US 
is one reference study in this research field. To our knowledge, only one study has been 
likewise done for Sweden. However, this study only investigates the insider’s relationship 
with the issuing company and its impact on the market reaction (Molin, 1996). Barclay et al.’s 
(2007) study is based on US companies which usually have a low initial ownership 
concentration. In contrast to this study, Sweden has different institutional characteristics. In 
Sweden, the average initial ownership concentration is very high as stated by Molin (1996). 
The underlying assumption for the monitoring hypothesis is that the ownership concentration 
increases because of private placements. Since the initial ownership concentration is already 
high in Sweden, private placements will lead to a decreased ownership concentration (Molin, 
1996). By considering the different market dynamics in the US and Sweden, it is interesting to 
investigate if Barclay et al.’s (2007) findings can explain the market reaction for a setting with 
initial high ownership concentration. This study will therefore investigate how the 
relationship of the private placement investors with the issuing company affects the short-
term market reactions in Sweden. The information, monitoring and managerial entrenchment 
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hypotheses will be tested for the different buyer groups of a private placement in the Swedish 
market environment. To our knowledge, no study has been done so far investigating this 
topic. The findings of this study will therefore contribute to the existing research by 
answering the following research question: 
Is there a difference in the short-term announcement effects of equity private 
placements depending on the investor’s involvement with the issuing firms in terms of 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts? 
In order to investigate this research question, we are going to do an event study followed up 
by a regression which allows us to include more variables of interest.  
1.4. LIMITATIONS 
Since this study only investigates the equity private placements in Sweden, the number of 
events is limited but it is estimated by us to be sufficient. In order to get a large enough 
sample, both regulated and unregulated markets are included. By including several market 
places, a larger variety of companies will be included. The time range covers one business 
cycle namely 2008 to 2014. The start of the current business cycle is defined by Bergman 
(2011) to begin in 2008, measured as the classical cycle top-to-top. It is not investigated how 
the abnormal returns develop over time since this study investigates the short-term effects. 
The reason for this is that we want to have the most recent data and a large enough sample. 
By investigating long term-effects, too many private placements would have been excluded. 
1.5. OUTLINE 
The thesis is divided into seven main sections: Introduction, theoretical framework, empirical 
findings on abnormal returns, methodology, empirical results, analysis and discussion and a 
conclusion. The first chapter, the introduction, describes the background of the study, the 
problem discussion and what the purpose of the study is. The second chapter, the theoretical 
framework section introduces the SEO topic and presents the main aspects of information 
asymmetry and agency theory related to private placements. The third chapter on the 
empirical findings of abnormal returns of private placements and in particularly the different 
private placement buyers completes the theoretical framework. As a result, this serves as a 
basis for the development of the research hypotheses for this study. The fourth chapter, the 
methodology, contains the scientific methodological approaches that have been applied. 
Besides that, the data collection process, the event study methodology and the OLS regression 
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are presented. The fifth chapter, the empirical results chapter points out the results from the 
conducted descriptive tests, the event study and the OLS regression with a broad discussion. 
In the sixth chapter, the analysis and discussion chapter, the empirical results are set in a 
context in order to interpret the findings in a critical way. The purpose of the section is to 
answer the research question by referring to the theory and the empirical outcomes. The thesis 
finishes up with a concluding discussion to summarize what has emerged in the analysis and 
ends with suggestions for further research. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
This chapter aims to present the relevant theories starting with a short overview of Seasoned 
Equity Offerings (SEO). The main focus is however on the equity private placements, the SEO 
issue type of interest. The respective theories of both the information asymmetry theory and 
the agency theory explaining the announcement effects to private placements will be likewise 
presented. Finally, an overview on the empirical implications the theories are suggesting is 
given. 
2.1. SEO MOTIVATIONS & ISSUE TYPES 
A company which is already listed on the stock exchange can raise supplementary capital by 
issuing additional shares through Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO). The academic literature 
provides various issue motives for raising additional capital associated with the different SEO 
issue types. SEOs address different investors and can therefore be classified into three issue 
types: rights issues, public issues and private placements (Molin, 1996). These three different 
issue types and its respective issue motives will be presented in the following sections.  
2.1.1. Rights issue 
There is a commonly accepted and used definition of rights issues among the research 
community. In rights issues, existing shareholders get the right or warrant to purchase new 
shares on a pro rata basis (Eckbo & Masulis, 1995; Molin, 1996; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2005; 
Gao & Ritter, 2007). Thus, current shareholders can maintain their equity stake without 
sustaining damage from dilution. Sometimes, investors are allowed to sell their pro rata rights 
if they do not want to make use of it (Hillier & Ross, 2013). According to the information 
asymmetry theory, managers conduct rights issues since they consider the firm to be 
overvalued and take advantage of this over-valuation (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Eckbo & 
Masulis, 1992, Kim & Weisbach, 2008).  
The predominating SEO issue types on the Stockholm Stock Exchange are rights issues and 
private placements (Molin, 1996). This is supported by a more recent paper of Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2003) and Bortoletti et al. (2008) who argue that SEOs are particularly conducted as 
rights offerings or private placements for stock markets outside the USA. In Sweden for 
instance the precedence right for current shareholders has traditionally had a strong position in 
the law and is still used in the majority of the SEOs (Skog, 2004). 
  
6 
 
2.1.2. Public offering 
Public offerings, also known as public issues, are offerings to the investment public (Nasdaq, 
2015). Since shares are not only sold to existing shareholders but also to new investors, this 
offering type leads to dilution. As far as the reasons for this issue type are concerned, Lee and 
Kocher (2001) state that public issues are done because of overvaluation. This is consistent 
with Myers and Majluf (1984) pointing out that managers might have incentives to sell 
overvalued securities because they want the existing shareholders to benefit at the expense of 
new shareholders.  
Since public issue is the most commonly used issue type in the US, the research is extensive 
compared to Europe where private placements and rights issues are mainly used for protecting 
shareholders as it is the case for Sweden. Hence, public offerings are rarely used for SEOs on 
the Stockholm Stock Exchange. (Molin, 1996) 
2.1.3. Private placement 
Private placements target only a small group of current or new shareholders. That is why 
managers can significantly influence the ownership structure according to their preferences. 
(Molin, 1996; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003) Furthermore, it is assumed that smaller firms have 
higher information asymmetry than bigger companies and therefore are more likely to issue 
private placements (Wruck, 1989; Wu, 2004). Since private placement issues lead to dilution 
effects for existing shareholders, the board of directors and the shareholders have to approve 
the private placement issue in Sweden (Molin, 1996). The predominating issue types on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange are either rights issues or private placements (Molin, 1996). This 
is supported by Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) stating that SEOs are particularly conducted as 
rights offerings or private placements for stock markets outside the US. In the next section, 
the explicit motivations for private placements are explained extensively since this study only 
focuses on private placements.  
2.2. PRIVATE PLACEMENT MOTIVATIONS 
The main theoretical motivations explaining private placements, information asymmetry and 
agency theory, will be described in the following section. The information asymmetry section 
will focus on the different levels of information available to investors. The agency theory 
section concentrates on the investor’s ability and willingness to monitor the management of 
the issuing firm.  
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2.2.1. Information asymmetry  
Information asymmetry is one of the most important reasons for announcement effects 
besides agency theory according to the research community explaining an extensive corporate 
finance literature on this topic (Harjoto & Garen, 2003). In the following sections, 
information asymmetry as an explanation for the announcement effect to private placements 
is divided into two parts, signaling theory and information hypothesis.  
2.2.1.1. Signaling theory 
Leland and Pyle (1977) argue in their famous signaling model that positive signs of firm value 
are transferred to the market if insiders increase their equity stake in a firm. Since they base 
their model on all kind of equity issues and do not concentrate on private placements, their 
model has to be considered cautiously in the private placement context. In addition, recent 
studies challenge Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signaling theory in general. Hull et al. (2010) 
cannot confirm Leland and Pyle’s signaling model when investigating in particularly short-
term abnormal returns to SEOs. They argue that the market reaction does not always depend 
on the level of insider ownership (Hull et al., 2010). Again, since Hull et al. (2010) investigate 
all SEO issue types, their findings have to be considered cautiously in the private placement 
context. However, Molin (1996) who particularly investigates private placements in Sweden, 
challenges the signaling model as well. He finds out that equity issues are not used as 
signaling devices since he does not find any significant announcement effect of private 
placements which are used for financing new projects. However, there is a large positive 
abnormal return if the private placement proceeds are used for financial restructuring. The 
signaling effect explaining positive abnormal returns to private placements are therefore not 
as sophisticated as believed. (Molin, 1996) Hertzel and Smith (1993), have a greater focus on 
private placements with regards to information asymmetry. In the next section their 
information hypothesis will be presented. 
2.2.1.2. Information hypothesis 
According to the information hypothesis developed by Hertzel and Smith (1993), private 
placements help to solve some of the information asymmetry about firm value between 
insiders and external investors. They explain this by extending Myers and Majluf’s (1984) 
adverse selection model that management has superior knowledge about a company’s true 
value compared to an external investor. Private placement investors can access at some cost 
the management’s superior knowledge about firm value while negotiating with the 
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management team. In case a well-informed investor invests in a company through a private 
placement, the market considers this as a sign of undervaluation and it results in positive 
abnormal returns. (Hertzel & Smith, 1993) Private placements which are used as a source for 
external capital by well-informed managers also transfer a positive sign to the market because 
it can be assumed that a firm has favorable prospects due to investments financed through a 
capital increase (Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Lee & Kocher, 2001). However, Barclay et al. 
(2007) challenge the information hypothesis by stating that the information hypothesis 
together with the monitoring hypothesis only motivate a minority of the positive market 
reactions to private placements. They argue that managerial entrenchment is more important 
for motivating private placements than commonly believed (Barclay, et al., 2007). 
2.2.2. Agency theory  
In the following sections, agency theory further explains why firms issue private placements. 
Several researchers argue that private placements align interests between managers and 
shareholders (Wruck, 1989; Molin, 1996; Barclay et al., 2007). The presented theory 
hypotheses are the monitoring hypothesis and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. 
2.2.2.1. Monitoring hypothesis 
Wruck (1989) introduces the monitoring hypothesis in the private placement context stating 
that investors who buy private placements are both willing and competent to monitor 
management. Wruck assumes that these investors often purchase a significant equity stake 
giving them access to the firm’s board. Thus, management can be monitored closely ensuring 
to some extent that resources are used efficiently. This in turn can lead to an increase in firm 
value. Assuming that agency costs are reduced, the market reacts with positive stock prices. 
Hence, shareholder’s wealth is increased meaning that current shareholders are not penalized. 
(Wruck, 1989) 
In contrast, the positive effect of the monitoring hypothesis is not been confirmed by Lee and 
Kocher (2001). They investigate that firms issuing private placements have lower free cash 
flows and higher managerial ownership than firms issuing public offerings. Considering that, 
agency problems between managers and shareholders might therefore not be aligned. (Lee & 
Kocher, 2001) 
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2.2.2.2. Managerial entrenchment hypothesis 
Dann and DeAngelo (1988) and Wruck (1989) were among the first researchers explaining 
managerial entrenchment as a reason for issuing private placements and how this could lead 
to negative abnormal returns. Dann and DeAngelo (1988) consider private placements as a 
manager’s means for avoiding takeovers. As a result, existing shareholders do not have the 
chance to benefit from favorable takeover bids. Wruck (1989) relates managerial 
entrenchment more to the general fact of ownership concentration. Negative abnormal returns 
are generated through the fact that an investor gains a controlling ownership position or for 
middle range ownership stakes (Wruck, 1989).  
Molin (1996) develops the managerial entrenchment hypothesis further and argues that 
solidified management control is linked to “insider opportunism”. The opportunism is arising 
from self-serving private placement deals done by large existing shareholders or management. 
Since private placements only address a few investors, the existing non-participating 
shareholders may be disadvantaged concerning the pricing of the issue. This could lead to a 
wealth transfer from existing shareholders to new shareholders resulting in negative market 
reactions. Barclay et al. (2007) confirm Molin (1996) and add that the issuing firm’s 
managers choose investors who do not aim to be actively involved in the company. As a 
result, the management can solidify their control which might not be positive for existing non-
participating shareholders leading to a negative market reaction (Barclay et al., 2007).  
In contrast to the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, which is associated with negative 
market returns, the convergence-of-interest hypothesis by Jensen and Meckling (1976) equity 
issues predicts positive market reactions. This is because an increase in the ownership 
concentration of insiders results in aligned interests between managers and shareholders. 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) It is important to mention that conclusions from this study have to 
be drawn cautiously since this study does not only relate to private placements but all SEOs. 
After having presented the relevant theories related to information asymmetry and agency 
theory, the next section summarizes their predicted announcement effect to private 
placements.  
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2.3. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The following table gives an overview of the previously presented theories and hypotheses 
and predicts the positive or negative market reaction to the announcement of private 
placements.  
Table 1: Empirical implications of abnormal returns predicted by the theory 
 
After this overview on the abnormal returns predicted by the theory, the exact empirical 
findings of abnormal returns to private placements are presented and discussed in the 
following chapter.  
  
Hypotheses & mechanisms
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
Signaling theory 
Leland & Pyle, 1977 
Molin, 1996 
Hull et al., 2010 
Information hypothesis 
Hertzel & Smith, 1993
Lee & Kocher, 2001
AGENCY THEORY
Monitoring hypothesis 
Wruck, 1989
Lee & Kocher, 2001
Managerial entrenchment hypothesis 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976
Dann & DeAngelo, 1988
Wruck, 1989
Molin, 1996
Barclay et al., 2007 



Positive Negative 





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3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
After having presented the most important theories related to private placements and their 
prediction on the abnormal returns, this chapter focuses on the exact empirical findings on 
the short-term abnormal returns to private placements. At the end of this chapter, the 
research hypotheses of this study will be presented. They are developed by combining both the 
theoretical framework and the empirical findings of abnormal returns. 
3.1. SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS  
Before focusing on the empirical findings for private placement, the empirical evidence for 
Seasoned Equity Offerings in general is shortly presented. The announcement effects of SEOs 
from publicly traded firms have been thoroughly investigated in the USA with an overall 
agreement on a negative market reaction. Asquith and Mullins (1986) were among the first 
researchers examining the announcement effects of SEOs from 1963 to 1981 and detect an 
average stock price decrease of 2% to 3% at the SEO announcement date. Both Masulis and 
Korwar (1986) and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) confirm an average equity price decrease of 
around 3% for the time range 1963-1981. These studies mostly focus on public issues since 
this has been and still is the most dominating issue type in the USA (Molin, 1996). 
3.2. PRIVATE PLACEMENTS 
Despite dilution effects of private placements and large discounts, private placements in 
general generate a positive short-term stock price effect investigated by Wruck (1989), 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Barclay et al. (2007) for the US and Molin (1996) and Nilsson 
and Cronqvist (2005) for Sweden as shown in table 2. The results of these studies are 
statistically significant, however small in magnitude.  
Table 2: Cumulative abnormal returns for private placements in US & Sweden 
 
The significance level is divided into three levels: * -10% level; ** -5% level; *** -1% level. 
As already shown in chapter 2, the research community explains these positive stock reactions 
with information asymmetry and agency theory. In addition, several researchers such as 
Wruck (1989) and Barclay et al. (2007) have proven that the stock price reactions depend on 
Authors Market Sample period Sample size CAR (-3,0) CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,0)
Wruck (1989) US 1979-1985 99 4,5%** - 1,9%*
Hertzel & Smith (1993) US 1980-1987 106 1,7%** - -
Molin (1996) Sweden 1986-1994 76 - 3,2%*** -
Cronqvist & Nilsson (2005) Sweden 1986-1999 136 - 7,3%*** -
Barclay et al. (2007) US 1979-1997 594 - - 1,7%***
12 
 
the buyer’s relationships with the issuing firm. Since this study investigates the private 
placement’s relationship with the issuing firm and its effect on the abnormal returns, the 
empirical findings for the different buyer categories will be presented in the following section. 
3.3. PRIVATE PLACEMENT BUYERS 
The positive short-term stock reaction to private placements depends heavily on buyer type 
meaning how much the investor is involved in the issuing firm (Barclay et al., 2007). 
Information asymmetry is here an overall important explanation why there are differences in 
the stock price reactions depending on the buyer’s relationships with the issuing firm. In other 
words the amount of information the buyer possesses of the true firm value compared to the 
information available to the market matters. (Wruck, 1989; Barclay et al., 2007) 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) find out that the short-term abnormal returns in private 
placements are higher when the shares are issued to insider investors compared to other 
investors. The authors refer to Leland and Pyle (1977) who have already explained that 
insider investors most probably know more about a firm’s future cash flows and the true firm 
value. Therefore, such an investment can be considered firstly as a certification of firm value 
and secondly reduces agency problems (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). This is consistent with 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) who argue that managers have knowledge about investment projects 
with positive NPVs. In order to realize this investment opportunity, cash in form of an equity 
issue is raised (Hertzel & Smith, 1993).  
In this study, we will focus on three different buyer categories: insider; active and passive 
buyers. Besides these three main categories, for some private placements there is a mix 
between those buyer categories. In the following section, the three main buyer groups as well 
as the mixed buyer group are presented. In addition, the empirical findings in terms of 
abnormal returns are presented for each buyer category. 
3.3.1. Insider buyer 
An insider buyer is characterized by Barclay et al. (2007) in the private placement context as 
an investor who is either a manager or a director of the issuing firm. Barclay et al. (2007) find 
out that insider placements or managerial placements show the lowest short-run abnormal 
returns (-0,7% but statistically insignificant) of all private placement buyers but the highest 
discounts. 
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It is not a surprise that insider buyers who have the highest amount of information available 
show the lowest positive abnormal returns since insider ownership is not always associated 
with positive aspects as it has been shown in the managerial entrenchment hypothesis section. 
Solidified management control can lead to possible self-serving private placement deals by 
large existing shareholders or management. By issuing private placements at a discount, 
insiders can especially benefit on private placement deals to themselves. Since the market is 
also aware of that, this in return leads to negative market reactions. It is therefore assumed 
that the overall positive market reactions to private placements is somewhat outweighed by 
this insider opportunism. (Molin, 1996; Barclay et al., 2007)  
3.3.2. Active buyer  
Active buyers are defined as external investors who are both willing and competent to 
monitor management. This is often another corporation buying a large-percentage of stocks in 
order to get involved in the firm. (Barclay et al., 2007) Wu (2004) shows that active investors 
are often institutional investors, such as funds or venture capitalists, who have a certain 
interest to monitor their portfolio companies.  
As already presented in the monitoring hypothesis section, private placements are mainly 
associated with positive abnormal returns if investors want to monitor. This is consistent with 
Barclay et al. (2007) who investigate that an active investor is perceived more favorably by 
the market than passive buyers. They find out that active placements are associated with a 
positive abnormal return of 5% at a 1% significance level. Those buyers who become active 
in the issuing company pay more than passive buyers when it comes to discounts of private 
placements. However, active buyers only made up 12% of their sample and therefore their 
conclusions have to be considered cautiously. (Barclay et al., 2007)  
3.3.3. Passive buyer  
According to several researchers, private placement buyers are often passive (Wu, 2004: 
Barclay et al., 2007). Barclay et al. (2007) categorize a private placement as passive when the 
buyer does not have any reported activity with the issuing firm. Therefore, their amount of 
information is the most limited of the three buyer categories. Since passive buyers do not 
participate in the current management, this helps management to solidify their control. As 
presented in the managerial hypothesis section, this might not be positive for non-
participating existing shareholders leading to a negative market reaction. As far as the exact 
market reaction to private placements of passive buyers is concerned, there are positive short-
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term abnormal stock returns of 1,4% at a 5% significance level as investigated by Barclay et 
al. (2007). However, they challenge this result since only 51% of the returns are positive. It is 
interesting to mention that their sample consists of more than 80% of passive private 
placements. Subsequently, it can be concluded that both the monitoring hypothesis and the 
information hypothesis can only explain a minority of private placements. (Barclay et al., 
2007) 
3.3.4. Mixed buyer  
Besides the above presented three main buyer categories, several buyer groups are mixed for 
some private placements. To our knowledge, there has not been much research on the mixed 
buyer group related to the private placement context. Yeh and Ma (2012) mention in their 
study that only main buyer categories should be included in order to obtain more accurate 
results. Furthermore, Barclay et al. (2007) also include the mixed buyer category in their 
study. 
3.4. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
By referring to the previously presented empirical evidence and the theoretical framework of 
chapter two, the following research hypotheses are developed. The first hypothesis is based on 
the presented empirical evidence that private placements lead to positive short-term abnormal 
returns (Wruck, 1989; Hertzel & Smith, 1993) as presented in the following:  
H1: The announcement of private placements leads to positive short-term abnormal returns.  
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis motivates our second hypothesis. Private 
placements to insiders can lead to a solidified management control which is linked to “insider 
opportunism” (Molin, 1996). Molin explains that the opportunism is arising from self-serving 
private placement deals done by large existing shareholders or management negative market 
reactions. To weight up the negative reactions, the signaling theory of Leland and Pyle (1977) 
is used as an explanation. This is due to their assumption that a positive signal is sent to the 
market when insiders increase their equity stake. With an emphasis on the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis, the second hypothesis is developed:  
H2: Insider buyers lead to lower abnormal returns than passive and mixed buyers. 
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The third hypothesis is based on the monitoring and information hypotheses. The monitoring 
hypothesis states that the identity of the buyer influences the abnormal returns. For an active 
buyer, a high positive abnormal return can be expected as explained by the monitoring 
hypothesis assuming that active buyers are both willing and competent to monitor 
management (Wruck, 1989). In addition, the information hypothesis states that a well-
informed private placement investor investing in a company, results in a positive market 
reaction because the market considers this as a sign of undervaluation. These theoretical 
assumptions lead us to the third hypothesis: 
H3: Active buyers are expected to lead to higher abnormal returns than passive and mixed 
buyers.  
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4. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter aims to provide a description of the procedure chosen for carrying out this 
study. Firstly, the research approach and research design are presented before moving on to 
the data collection. The used empirical models, the event study and the OLS regression are 
further presented. This chapter finishes with the validity and reliability sections.  
4.1. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The two most common methods in research are the inductive and the deductive research 
approach. The inductive approach is applied when the results are drawn from research 
whereas the deductive approach builds up on earlier theories. (Patel & Davidson, 2003) In this 
study, the deductive approach is used. According to Bryman and Bell (2011) the deductive 
approach is best suited for developing hypotheses to test the validity of several theories. 
Therefore, several hypotheses based on the theory have been developed as shown previously. 
These research hypotheses will be investigated through an event study and an OLS regression 
which will be later presented in more detail.  
4.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
According to Lewis et al. (2009) a research can be conducted as exploratory, descriptive or 
explanatory design. Malhotra and Grover (1998) explain that the purpose of an exploratory 
research is to become more familiar with an area or problem. A descriptive research has the 
aim to describe a specific situation or problem, whereas an explanatory is devoted of finding a 
relationship between variables from theory based expectations (Malhotra & Grover, 1998). 
The explanatory research is usually used together with quantitative data collection (Lewis et 
al., 2009). We have chosen an explanatory design since we aim to explain the relationship 
between abnormal returns and the buyers’ relationship with the firm issuing the security in a 
private placement.  
Aliaga and Gunderson (2002) define the quantitative research method as an ‘explaining 
phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analysed using mathematically based 
methods (…)’. The quantitative method is chosen in this study since both an event study and a 
regression are done whereas a qualitative study is rejected since it often lacks objectivity 
which is highly relevant for statistical analysis than this study.  
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4.3. LITERATURE STUDY 
Material has been collected by searching for articles in the journal databases. To get a deeper 
knowledge in the area being studied, scientific articles and books were selected. Scientific 
articles undergo a rigorous review process before they are published and can therefore usually 
be considered to be reliable. It is also important to consider where the article is published 
since the quality of the publisher can therefore vary. In general, articles get published faster 
than books and due to this articles contain more recent research. Due to the above mentioned 
arguments, the theoretical framework mainly consists of scientific articles. The search was 
performed by discussing key concepts of the topic and then key words were used to find 
relevant theories. The key words used are: SEO, Seasoned equity offer, Secondary equity 
offer, announcement effect, abnormal return, private placement, information asymmetry, 
buyer identity, managerial entrenchment hypothesis, information hypothesis, monitoring 
hypothesis. This literature review helped then to construct a theoretical framework and the 
empirical findings chapter on which the research hypotheses are based. 
4.4. DATA COLLECTION  
In this study data has been collected using existing literature, articles, data bases, press 
releases and annual reports. The specific data selection criteria are explained in the following 
section. 
4.4.1. Data selection criteria 
Data is gathered from various databases to ensure data quality. There are several stock 
markets in Sweden. Some are regulated and some have less strict rules which are called 
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF). Our sample consists of observations from the regulated 
markets NASDAQ OMX Stockholm and NGM Equity, as well as the MTFs including First 
North, Aktietorget and Nordic MTF. We believe that it adds value and depth to our analysis to 
include companies from the smaller marketplaces since then we can collect a larger variety of 
firms. The MTF lists are often market places where companies first list before deciding to be 
listed on larger regulated markets. Smaller lists are also characterized by a greater SEO 
activity in the recent years which leads to a larger sample for this study. Transactions 
containing warrants or options are difficult to value and are therefore excluded in our sample.  
We gathered all the SEO's from the mentioned lists above from Nyemissioner.se between 
2008 and 2014 and put it into a table. This table served as a basis and then more issues were 
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added on by identifying SEOs from other sources. One of these was Thomson Reuters Eikon 
where only SEOs for the time range from 2011 onwards could be identified. Therefore, data 
was further gathered from the SDC database from Thomson Reuters, the standard database 
when it comes to equity transactions. Further information was gathered through press releases 
and annual reports to determine if it the issue was cancelled, a public offering, rights offering, 
a private placement or an IPO. The IPO category also contains the transactions that included a 
list change. The development of the issue activity is shown in figure 1 and the exact numbers 
and definitions can be found in the appendix A. 
Further information was gathered through press releases and annual reports to determine if it 
the issue was cancelled, a public offering, rights offering, a private placement or an IPO. The 
IPO category also contains the transactions that included a list change. The development of 
the issue activity is shown in figure 1 and the exact numbers and definitions can be found in 
appendix A. 
 
Figure 1: Equity issue activities in Sweden between 2008 and 2014 
The total sample consists of 970 events. The biggest group is rights offering with 565 events, in second place are the IPO/list 
change activities with 169 events. The private placements are 128 in total, closely followed by public offerings with 100 
events. A small number of the investigated issues were never completed, 8 in total. There are most certainly more issues that 
are cancelled during this period but they are not captured in our list. 
This process produces a sample of 128 private placements. To determine if the issues could be 
included in our event study we gathered stock prices and announcement days. After that, all 
private placements with another event such an IPO, list change or SEO happening within the 
previous 251 trading days of the announcement day were excluded. This was done to avoid 
that previous events affect the normal return calculation in the estimation window in the event 
study. According to MacKinlay (1997), it is important that the estimation window and event 
window do not overlap otherwise the estimators for the parameters of the normal return model 
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would be influenced by the returns around the window. By excluding private placement with 
other event windows in the estimation window we avoid normal return measurements to be 
biased. Some other events were excluded since the trading day data was not sufficient for 
creating an estimation window. After all these adjustments, the final event study sample 
consists of 64 events. This is comparable with the sample size in earlier studies of private 
placements such as Wruck (1989).Wruck’s core analysis involves between 48 and 128 
observations. Hertzel and Smith (1993) have 106 observations. All the relevant data gathered 
for the private placements can be found in appendix B. 
4.4.2. Categorization of the buyer type  
We divide the sample into four different categories: active buyer, insider buyer, passive buyer 
and mixed buyer. The definitions of the buyers are the same as used by Barclay et al. (2007) 
and as presented in chapter three. 
Active buyers are defined as outside investors who are both willing and able to monitor 
management (Barclay et al., 2007). The words we searched for during the data gathering was: 
"strategic partner" or "long term commitment". Furthermore, we checked and these investors 
became larger shareholders with an ownership limit of 10% based on the post issue ownership 
percentage. Insider buyers are investors who are either involved in the management as 
managers, directors of the issuing firm or large shareholders with more than 10% ownership 
before the issue. The insider categorization is the strictest one where we have followed the 
classification drawn up by NASDAQ and Aktietorget. Passive buyers are investors, who are 
not currently involved in the issuing firm, and neither announce they are going to get 
involved. Mixed buyers are private placements including more than one of the 
abovementioned buyers. By introducing the mixed group, we create the possibility to have 
exclusive and exhaustive groups. Press releases and annual reports are used to categorize the 
buyers in the respective category. The categorization is distributed as it can be seen in the 
following table.  
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Table 3: Private equity placements per buyer in Sweden between 2009 and 2014 
 
The active buyers are the largest group with 27 placements or 42% of the total sample. The 
passive buyer group is the second biggest group with 22 placements or 34% of the total 
sample. The insider buyers and the mixed group are the smallest categories.  
4.5. EVENT STUDY 
After having gathered all relevant data, an event study has been chosen in order to analyse the 
announcement effect to private placements which relates to the first research hypothesis. 
According to Binder (1998), the event study methodology has become the standard 
methodology for measuring the security price reaction to events such as the issue of private 
placements. This is measured by calculating abnormal returns which is later explained in 
more detail. Fama et al. (1969) introduce the event study methodology in their paper which is 
considered as one of the reference methodologies among the research community. This event 
study methodology offers several advantages. Firstly, it allows testing if the market efficiently 
considers information as it has been developed by Fama et al. (1969). Secondly, event studies 
aim to examine the impact of the event on the share price or in other words event studies 
investigate the effect on the wealth of the firm’s shareholders (Binder, 1998). The event study 
methodology has been developed constantly over time implying that there are different ways 
of proceeding. However, in the present event study, the approach of MacKinlay (1997) is used 
since it is considered as one of the most recent reference papers (Eckbo, 2006).  
4.5.1. Normal return models 
MacKinlay (1997) suggests starting the event study methodology by calculating the abnormal 
returns. A normal return model is necessary for doing so. There are various approaches 
available how to calculate the normal return of a security. They can be divided in two 
categories, the statistical and the economic approach. The statistical models only incorporate 
statistical assumptions concerning the behavior of asset returns. The underlying assumption is 
that the asset returns are jointly normal and independently distributed through time. Even if 
Year Number Proceeds Number Proceeds Number Proceeds Number Proceeds Number Proceeds
All 64 3 563 27 1 106 8 43 7 84 22 2 330
2009 3 243 2 200 1 43
2010 5 190 1 19 1 3 1 17 2 152
2011 7 109 1 17 2 22 2 41 2 30
2012 19 2 053 8 185 2 7 2 6 7 1 855
2013 17 528 9 369 1 3 7 156
2014 13 439 6 317 2 9 2 20 3 93
PassiveMixInsiderAll private placements Active
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the distributional assumption is strong, it generally does not lead to problems in practice 
considering the fact that it is empirically reasonable. Examples for this category are the 
market model, the market-adjusted return model or the constant mean return model. In 
contrast to statistical normal return models, economic normal return models are based on both 
statistical and economic assumptions. Therefore, economic models offer on the one hand the 
opportunity to calculate the normal returns more precisely but on the other the underlying 
restrictions are more constrained. (MacKinlay, 1997) The economic normal return model is 
not further specified since a statistical model, the market model is used for the present event 
study. The market model is presented in the following section. 
4.5.2. Market model 
Several event study methodology models have been assessed, but the market model has been 
chosen for various reasons. Firstly, the market model is known for its simplicity since it is a 
linear statistical model which assumes a linear relationship between the stock returns and the 
market returns. Secondly, the market model is the commonly used methodology for 
investigating stock price reactions to announcements of private placements as it has been used 
by Wruck (1989), Molin (1996) and Barclay et al. (2007). Thirdly, this model reduces the 
variance of the abnormal return by removing exactly that portion of the return that is related 
to the variation in the market’s return. The benefit of this variance reduction depends on R2 
since the higher R
2 
is, the greater the variation reduction of the abnormal return. (MacKinlay, 
1997) The market model formula is presented below.  
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit  
E(εit = 0)  var(εit) = σε
2
 
 
The market model in formula 1 above is for any security i where Rit is the observed arithmetic 
daily return for the private placement i at day t, whereas Rmt is the return on the market 
portfolio at day t (MacKinlay, 1997). Daily returns are said to to perform well with daily 
stock returns (Brown and Warner, 1985). Furthermore, εit is the zero mean disturbance term. 
The other variables of the market model namely αi, βi, and σε
2
 are parameters of the market 
model. The intercept âi  and the coefficients β^i are computed by OLS regressions of Rit on Rmt. 
In other words, both α and β of each stock are calculated by regressing the return of the stock 
on every day in the estimation window to the return of the market. This, in turn, provides the 
(1) 
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parameters for estimating the normal return for every stock and day in the event window. 
(MacKinlay, 1997) The parameters are calculated as following: 
 
The market portfolio returns are estimated by means of a linear regression of the company’s 
stock return on the Affärsvärldens Generalindex (AFGX). According to Molin (1996), AFGX 
is the oldest and most well-known value-weighted index of the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
The AFGX has been extracted from Datastream using the OMX Affärsvärldens Generalindex 
with the shortcut OMXAFGX in Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
4.5.3. Event and estimation window 
In order to apply the previously presented market model, both the event window and the 
estimation window have to be defined. The event window is the ‘period of interest over which 
the security prices of the firms involved in this event will be examined (…) including the event 
announcement’ (MacKinlay, 1997). In other words, it is necessary to define the time period 
over which the abnormal returns are measured. MacKinlay (1997) further specifies that the 
event window is commonly defined to be larger than the period of interest including days 
before and after the event. He specifies that event windows which are too narrow do not fully 
capture the full effect of the event whereas too broad event windows might capture 
information and reactions which are not connected to the studied event. For the present event 
study, the event window is conducted from 1 day before the announcement of the private 
placement to 1 day after the private placement has been announced. By doing so, the 
possibility that some information have leaked before the announcement is taken into account. 
In addition, the possibility that the market needs some time to react is included as well. It is 
assumed that the event day and one day after the event day is sufficient taking into 
consideration today's speed of information. The same event window is used by relevant event 
studies in the private placement field done by Molin (1996) and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) 
in Sweden.  
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
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The estimation window, the time period on which the estimation of the normal return is based, 
has to be fixed as well. A balance in the trade-off between improved accuracy of the 
parameters (β and α) and the possibility of significant parameter shifts over time has to be 
found. On the one hand, a longer estimation window leads to more accurate parameters but on 
the other hand this increases the risk that structural breaks such as stock splits have caused the 
current parameters to be significantly different from the parameters in the past. (MacKinlay, 
1997)  
For the present event study, an estimation window of 251 days before the event up to 11 days 
before the event day is chosen. Observations are only included in the sample if the stock is 
traded during all of the days in the estimation window. This length corresponds approximately 
one calendar year and is further assumed to be large enough to neutralize any seasonality that 
could occur during a year and therefore effect the calculations. In addition, data quality 
checks have been done in order to identify possible structural breaks such as stock splits 
leading to biased parameters (Skatteverket, 2015). Skatteverket gathers all stock splits for 
listed companies and it has been used as a source to adjust the stock prices in the calculations. 
This is consistent with MacKinlay (1997) who insists on the fact that stock splits can 
influence the data heavily with a long estimation window. Mitigation was done by adjusting 
for stock splits and making sure that we used adjusted stock price data.  
It is important that the event window and the estimation window do not overlap otherwise the 
estimators for the parameters of the normal return model would be influenced by the returns 
around the window. The normal return measurement would then be biased since both the 
returns of the estimation window and the event window would capture the event impact. 
Subsequently, one of the main assumptions of the event study methodology that the abnormal 
returns capture the event impact would be violated. (MacKinlay, 1997)  
4.5.4. Abnormal returns 
After having identified the time windows allowing calculating the normal returns by means of 
the market model, the abnormal returns can be calculated for the event window. The abnormal 
return is defined as disturbance term of the market model which is the difference between the 
actual return and the expected return calculated with the market model. The formula to 
calculate it is presented in formula 4. (MacKinlay, 1997) 
ARit = Rit - αi - βiRmt  (4) 
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In order to draw inferences of the impact of the event, MacKinlay (1997) suggests that the 
individual abnormal returns have to be cumulated through time and across securities by means 
of appropriate techniques. This is necessary in order to examine whether the announcement of 
private placements has an effect on the stock price. The following formula is used for doing 
so 
 
where N is the number of observations and ARit are the abnormal returns for the individual 
securities. The variance of the abnormal returns is then calculated by means of the following 
formula 
   
where σε
2
 is the disturbance variance which is calculated with formula 7. 
    
With a large enough estimation window, L1 solves the sampling error arising from αi and βi 
since the sampling error approaches zero meaning that the variance of the abnormal returns is 
σε
2 
and the abnormal returns become independent through time. (MacKinlay, 1997) Since we 
use a large estimation window of 240 trading days this sampling error can be assumed to be 
marginal and can be neglected for our event study. The variance for each firm is then 
cumulated with formula 8 and the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns is calculated with 
formula 9.  
 
  
(6) 
(5) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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Finally, inferences about the cumulative abnormal returns, CAR, are drawn by testing the null 
hypothesis Ho that the abnormal returns are zero under the assumption that the daily abnormal 
returns are normally distributed. The Ho hypothesis can be tested by the following formula  
 
The cumulative abnormal returns are significant if the Ho hypothesis can be rejected. It is 
commonly recommended to test the used normal return model for robustness. Molin (1996) 
uses the market-adjusted abnormal return model for testing if the private placement’s market 
reaction is not biased by the model used. This can be tested by means of the following 
formula  
    ARit = Rit - Rmt            (11)   
The market-adjusted return model can be considered as a restricted market model since the 
parameter αi is zero whereas βi is one. Since these restrictions could lead to biases, it is 
generally recommended to use such a restricted model only if necessary as for comparing the 
results of the market model to another model. (MacKinlay, 1997) 
4.6. CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION 
In order to test the impact of the specific impact of the different buyer categories on the 
abnormal returns, a cross-sectional regression is done. This can be helpful when it is 
interesting to investigate how different variables affect an outcome, e.g. how abnormal returns 
are affected by the type of buyer. The basic approach is to run a cross-sectional regression 
with abnormal returns as the dependent variable and the characteristics of interest as 
independent variables. It can be estimated using the widely used Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression. In the following the regression and its respective variables are explained.  
4.6.1. Description of regression variables 
The focus is to investigate the effect of the buyer type on the abnormal returns. In this 
regression several control variables will be included in order to check if other variables also 
have an effect on the abnormal returns. The regression that will be tested is the following: 
CARadj = αi + β1*active buyer + β2*insider buyer + β3*firm size + β4*issue size + 
β5*(issue size/firm size) + β6*financial restructuring + β7*regulated market + εi 
(10) 
(12) 
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Where αi is the intercept of the regression, β is the slope coefficient, εi is the error term and the 
rest of the variables are explained in the following text. In the categorization of the buyer type 
section we defined four different groups of private placement buyers: active buyer, passive 
buyer, insider buyer and mixed. To avoid the dummy variable trap in the regression, we drop 
the passive buyers and the mixed group and use these variables as our base group. The 
reasoning is that the abnormal return from the insider should generate the lowest result and 
the active buyer should generate the highest abnormal return which is consistent with the 
developed research hypotheses. By dropping both passive and mixed buyers, the regression 
results can be analyzed through the change from the base groups. 
4.6.1.1. Dependent variable  
A discount-adjusted abnormal return variable, CAR
adj
, is used as the dependent variable for 
the event window ±1 day. The abnormal return from an announcement of a private placement 
consists of two components; the first is the abnormal return resulting from new information. 
The second component is the abnormal return representing the compensation of the purchaser 
for contributing positively to the firm value (Wruck, 1989). In other words, event study results 
are strongly impacted by pricing effects, which is called compensation to the buyer by Wruck 
(1989). Therefore, the abnormal return variable is adjusted for discounts. The pricing effects 
arise from the difference of the offer price of private placements and the market price of the 
stock on the announcement day. Discounts to private placement investors lead to dilution of 
current shareholders who do not participate in the private placements deal. The stock market 
reaction reflects such a dilution effect from the private placement discount. In contrast, 
premiums to private placements relative to the market price lead to a wealth transfer from new 
investors to non-participating shareholders (Molin, 1996). By adjusting AR for discounts, the 
abnormal return reactions without pricing effect can be isolated and we can study the 
abnormal part that is a result of new information released to the market. To calculate the 
adjustment the formula used by Molin (1996) is applied as it can be seen in the following: 
  
where ΔS is the number of securities of the private placement deal, S0 is the number of shares 
before the sale, p-1 is the market price on the day before the announcement, p0 is the event 
market price, poffer is the price of the private placement offer.  
(13) 
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The adjusted AR from the event day is added together with the day before and after to get 
CAR
adj
. 
CAR
adj
 = AR-1+AR0
adj
+AR1 
4.6.1.2. Independent variables  
In the following section, the chosen independent variables in the regression are explained. 
They have been chosen by examining respective private placement studies such as those of 
Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), Molin (1996) and Barclay et al. (2007). The 
different buyers are the variables of interest whereas the other important variables are control 
variables.  
Active buyers are outside investors who are both willing and able to monitor management. A 
dummy variable is used which equals one if the buyer of the private placement becomes 
active in the company or zero otherwise. Insider buyers are investors who are either involved 
in the management as managers, directors of the issuing firm or a large shareholder with more 
than 10% ownership. This variable takes a value of one if the buyer is a member of the 
management prior to the private placement or zero otherwise. In order to make sure that the 
regression only examines these variables of interest, control variables are included in the 
regression as explained in the following section. 
Several control variables are included in the regression since it can be assumed that there are 
other factors affecting the short-term abnormal returns than the identity of the buyer. That is 
why control variables are included to check if there are other parameters that are important 
and if the abnormal results still hold.  
Firm size is defined as the market value of equity 30 days prior to the announcement. The 
market value measured as market capitalization has been likewise used by prior studies as a 
proxy for information asymmetry (Molin, 1996; Barclay et al., 2007). As shown by Asquith 
and Mullins (1986), the firm size impacts the abnormal returns of an equity issue 
announcement. It is assumed that information asymmetry is larger in small firms leading to 
larger information effects (Freeman, 1987; Corwin, 2003). 
Issue size is measured as the gross process from the private placement offer and is an 
alternative proxy for size effects. Mikkelson and Partch (1985) and Asquith and Mullins 
(1986) discover a significant relationship between issue size and abnormal returns on the 
(14) 
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announcement day. This could not entirely be confirmed since other researchers only find a 
sporadic effect between issue size and announcement effects. They entirely reject any 
significant impact of issue size on announcement effects (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Barclay 
& Litzenberger, 1988; Korajczyk et al., 1990; Barclay et al., 2007). 
The relative offer size, defined as issue size/firm size, captures the issue size relative to the 
total market value of the firm prior to an equity offer. Hertzel and Smith (1993) show that 
information effects are large when the degree of undervaluation is high. This is then captured 
by the relative issue size.  
Since private placement offers can also be used for a firm’s financial restructuring, 
announcement effects can result from restructuring reasons as it has been tested in previous 
studies such as those of Molin (1996). A dummy variable is therefore included which equals 
one if the private placement proceeds are used for a firm’s restructuring and zero otherwise.  
In this present study both regulated and non-regulated markets are included and we want to 
control for it. To do this, we include the variable regulated market. This is due to the fact that 
information asymmetry is greater on unregulated marketplaces such as First North; 
Aktietorget; NGM Nordic MTF. On the non-regulated markets, firms do not face as strict 
regulations as on regulated markets, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and NGM Equity 
(Finansinspektionen, 2015). In case of a private placement offer is made on a regulated 
market, the dummy variable is one, otherwise zero.  
4.7. VALIDITY & RELIABILITY  
In the following section, validity is discussed for this study. After that the reliability section 
explains what has been done to ensure that the results can be repeated.  
4.7.1. Validity 
Validity concerns how the factors selected to study a phenomenon really describes the 
phenomenon (Bryman, 2004). According to Wiedersheim and Eriksson (1991), the term may 
be divided into internal and external validity. The internal validity is firstly presented making 
sure that the right phenomena has been investigated in our study. This is followed by the 
external validity section meaning the degree of which the results can be generalized. 
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4.7.1.1. Internal validity 
The internal validity ensures that the constructed model and gathered capture the reality that 
exists and if the researcher is studying what she or he believes to study (Wiedersheim & 
Eriksson, 1991). Our internal validity is mostly affected by the categorization of the buyers. 
We recognize that the categorization of buyers, as any categorization, has its limitations. The 
difficulty with repeating the exactly same classification is that the researcher can bias it. If 
another person would repeat the classification, they might classify some of the buyers in a 
different way. The insider categorization is the strictest one for which we follow the 
classification drawn up by NASDAQ and Aktietorget, i.e. to top manager, member of the 
board, auditor or a larger shareholder holding more than 10% before the private placement or 
related to one of the above. For the classification of an active buyer we have looked for words 
as: "strategic partner", "long term commitment" and if they become a larger shareholder with 
over 10% based on post issue ownership percentage. The definition between active and a 
passive buyer is heavily dependent on the communicated information. Unless we have 
misclassified some placements, the classification mistakes should be quite small since we 
followed strict rules while gathering the data and making the classifications.  
4.7.1.2. External validity 
The external validity consists of the degree of which the results can be generalized, if the 
results of the work are applicable to more than one case (Wiedersheim & Eriksson, 1991). If 
the purpose of a research is to generalize the result over a population, the question is if the 
sample that is used is appropriate (Lewis et al., 2009). To mitigate this issue, several tests 
have been conducted on the gathered data to minimize faulty conclusions and generalizations. 
In order to test data quality and the power of the results, several empirical results and 
diagnostics were done. In a study with limited number of observations, which is the case for 
the present study, the empirical results can be heavily influenced by a few observations only. 
To avoid skewness of data, any kind of outliers will be excluded. We define outliers as an 
issue that deviate more than two standard deviations (outside 95 percent of observations) from 
the mean of the sample. In the empirical results chapter, various tests are made to investigate 
whether the Ordinary-Least-Square assumptions hold: The Jaque-Berra test is conducted to 
investigate if the variables are normally distributed. Multicollinearity is checked by 
examining whether there are correlations between the independent variables. A test for 
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heteroskedasticity is likewise conducted. It has to be noted that if the underlying OLS 
assumptions do not hold, inferences on the standard t-test will be less certain (Brooks, 2008). 
In empirical corporate finance studies, endogeneity is one of the most important and pervasive 
issues that have to be controlled for (Roberts & Whited, 2012). In this study we have 
identified two issues that could lead to endogeneity: omitted variables and selection bias. 
Regarding omitted variables, there are likely to be factors we have not controlled for leading 
to omitted variables. Since private placements are motivated by a various amount of reasons 
according to Barclay et al. (2007), this makes it difficult to include all relevant variables. 
Selection bias derives from the type of firms issuing a private placement. We assume that 
firms with specific firm characteristics, e.g. within a certain industry, are more likely to issue 
private placements leading a non-random selection. We acknowledge the possibility of 
selection biases and omitted variables and then try to mitigate the effects from them. The 
selection bias is mitigated to some extent by including all the stock markets in Sweden to get 
a great variety of companies. For the omitted variables we challenge our result in different 
regression scenarios to investigate if our variables should be included in our model based on 
the theory available for private placements.  
4.7.2. Reliability 
Reliability is according to Merriam (1988) the extent to which the results can be repeated. To 
ensure the reliability, the work process consisted of thoroughly documenting the research 
process phases presented in the methodology chapter. This makes it possible to conduct the 
same study at a later time (Yin, 2003). Our data is collected from well-known databases 
which are reliable and updated such as Thomson Reuters Eikon, Thomson Reuters SDC, 
Thomson Reuters Datastream, Nyemissioner, NASDAQ OMX, NGM and Aktietorget. The 
gathered data is documented and put together in a systematic way in Excel. In order to ensure 
data quality the authors of this paper had it as a routine to double check each other’s work 
during the whole process.  
The methodology concerning the empirical part of this study is described in the following 
chapter presenting the empirical results of both the event study and the OLS regression. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter provides the empirical results of the research conducted. It starts with the results 
from the event study meaning the calculations of the adjusted abnormal returns for both the 
total sample and respective sub-samples. Afterwards, the descriptive statistics and the 
regression results will be presented.  
5.1. EVENT STUDY RESULTS  
The event study results are divided in two sections starting with the total sample and then 
followed by the different private placement buyer categories.  
5.1.1. Abnormal returns for total sample  
The market-model was used as event-study methodology to study the stock price reaction to 
the announcements of private placements. The estimation period includes day −251 until day 
−11, which is approximately one calendar year. Day 0 is the trading day when the 
announcement actually affected the stock price, e.g. if the information was published after the 
stock exchange was closed, the next trading day is day 0. Several event windows were 
cumulated in order to investigate how the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) changes for a 
different time period. In figure 2, the average CAR is presented as a function of the different 
event windows. 
 
Figure 2: Mean CAR as a function of event windows 
The results indicate a positive average abnormal return following the announcement of private 
placements. In the table below, the average CAR and its respective significance levels are 
presented for different event windows.  
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Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows 
 
The significance level is divided into three different levels, t-statistics for 2-tailed test with 63 degrees  
of freedom in parenthesis: * - 10% level (1,6706), ** - 5% level (2,0003); *** - 1% level (2,6603). 
The null hypothesis tested in the event study is that the event has no impact on the firm value. 
The t-statistics is calculated by dividing the CAR mean by the root of the variance of CAR 
mean as described in the methodology chapter. The null hypothesis can be rejected for eight 
of the event windows because of significant results. When only including both the event day 
or ±7 days and more, the event study results are no longer significant. All calculations of 
abnormal returns for the event study can be found in appendix C. To check the robustness of 
the event study results, we also use the market-adjusted abnormal return model to test if the 
market reaction is biased by the model used. The results from the market-adjusted abnormal 
return model are consistent with the results from the market model. A comparison is included 
in appendix D.  
5.1.2. Categorization per buyer group  
The aggregated results of all private placements hide considerable differences among the 
private placement buyers. Dividing the event study results in the different buyer groups gives 
more nuanced results. This helps to identify patterns which have not been recognized in the 
total sample. In figure 3 the aggregated abnormal returns per private placement buyer group is 
presented for three days before and three days after the event day. 
 
 
 
 
 
Event 
window
Variance
(mean CAR) CAR mean T-statistics
Significance 
level
CAR 0 0,000 3,3% 1,48
CAR 0, +1 0,000 4,0% 2,55 **
CAR +-1 0,000 4,5% 2,37 **
CAR -1,+2 0,000 5,6% 2,51 **
CAR +-2 0,001 5,9% 2,37 **
CAR +-3 0,001 5,4% 1,83 *
CAR +-4 0,001 6,1% 1,83 *
CAR +-5 0,001 7,7% 2,10 **
CAR +-6 0,002 8,8% 2,21 **
CAR +-7 0,002 4,6% 1,08
CAR +-8 0,002 6,1% 1,34
CAR +-9 0,002 4,6% 0,95
CAR +-10 0,003 3,5% 0,69
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Figure 3: Abnormal returns aggregated per event day 
Aggregated, market-model abnormal stock returns for 64 private placements in Sweden between 2009 and 2014. Day 0 is the 
announcement day of the placement or the day after is the press release was done after the stock exchange was closed.  
The graph shows that insider buyer results in a very negative stock price reaction on the event 
day and the mixed group follows the same pattern. Both passive and active buyers show a 
positive stock price reaction on the announcement day. More details about the aggregated 
abnormal returns per day and buyer can be found in appendix E. For the event window ±1 day 
the cumulative abnormal returns per buyer group and its significance levels are presented in 
the table below.  
Table 5: CAR per buyer over event window: ±1 day 
 
Degrees of freedom are calculated by taking the number of events -1. The significance level is divided into three different 
levels, t-statistics for 2-tailed test with different degrees of freedom: * - 10% level ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level. 
The passive buyer group is the only group showing a significant result with a mean of 8,06% 
at a 1% significance level. The announcement effect for the active and the mixed buyers is 
positive while it is negative for the insider buyers. Since the results for those three buyer 
groups are insignificant and small in number of events for both the insider and mixed buyers, 
no strong conclusion can be drawn.  
  
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Insider buyer Active buyer Passive buyer Mixed
Buyer Insider buyer Active buyer Passive buyer Mixed
Degrees of freedom 7 26 21 6
Var(meanCAR) 0,0031 0,0012 0,0004 0,0050
CAR mean -7,68% 4,83% 8,06% 6,33%
T-statistics -1,3874 1,4053 3,9507 0,8958
Significance level ***
34 
 
5.2. DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS 
Discounts and premiums can influence the abnormal returns heavily. To understand how 
much we will have a closer look at our sample. In the following sections the discounts and 
premiums will be presented, firstly for the total sample and then for the different market 
places. 
5.2.1. Pricing of total sample 
Firstly, the discounts and premiums are presented for the total sample. Table 6 gives an 
overview on the total sample by comparing the closing price of the event day with the issue 
price. A negative number (-) indicates a premium and a positive number (+) a discount. 
Table 6: Discounts and premiums per buyer 
 
Discount is the per share closing price of the placement on the announcement day minus the offer price and then put in 
relation to the announcement day price (Barclay et al, 2007).  
The data in table 6 suggests that the pricing of private placements varies with the buyer 
category. This is yet another of several empirical findings that differ across the four categories 
of private placements. The passive buyer is the only group that on average gets a discount and 
the other groups have to pay a premium. Since there is a big difference between the minimum 
and maximum values, the average number might be a bit misleading. It is therefore necessary 
to consider both the median and the number of events. It can be seen that for most of the 
buyers the number of discounts is bigger than the number of premiums. About 60% of the 
total sample gets a discount. This is reflected in the median number which is higher than the 
average.  
5.2.2. Differences between market places 
The smaller market places are characterized by more illiquid stocks and prices under 1 SEK 
according to our sample. On smaller market places a small change in the price can result in a 
big premium or discount. The following figure shows the discounts and premiums for the five 
analysed market places. A detailed table with the discounts and premiums and divided per 
market can be found in appendix F. 
All buyers
(n=59)
Insider buyers
(n=7)
Active buyers
(n=25)
Passive buyers
(n=21)
Mix buyers
(n=6)
# Premium 25 5 9 8 3
# Discount 34 2 16 13 3
Mean -2% -2% -3% 4% -12%
Median 3% -10% 5% 5% 2%
Min -157% -31% -130% -53% -157%
Max 56% 56% 54% 44% 50%
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Figure 4: Discount and premium per market 
The discount is the per share closing price of the placement on the announcement day minus the offer price and then put in 
relation to the announcement day price (Barclay et al, 2007). A negative number (-) indicates a premium and a positive 
number (+) a discount. Total number of events is 59, divided per market the number is: 12 on NASDAQ Stockholm; 3 on 
NGM Equity; 24 on Aktietorget; 17 on First North; 3 Nordic MTF.  
It can be seen that there is a big difference in the discounts or premiums for most of the 
market places. For Aktietorget these values are even more extreme. This market place has a 
lot of stock which is traded under 1 SEK, which means that a small difference between the 
stock price and offer price results in some extreme values. The most extreme minimum values 
are -130% and -157% as presented in figure 4. More details about the prices can be found in 
appendix F.  
5.3. ADJUSTMENTS OF ABNORMAL RETURNS  
This section explains how the data is adjusted for discounts and premiums. This is done to 
draw conclusions from the regression focusing on the information and not on the pricing 
effect. 
5.3.1. Adjustment for discounts  
As described in the methodology chapter, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from the 
event study within the event window ±1 day will be adjusted for discounts and premiums. In 
the table below, the adjustments are presented and a more detailed calculation can be found in 
appendix G. 
Table 7: CARadj for discounts and premiums over the event window: ±1 day 
 
-160%
-110%
-60%
-10%
40%
Nasdaq OMX
Stockholm
NGM Equity Aktietorget First North Nordic MTF
Mean Median Min Max
All buyers
(n=64)
Insider buyers
(n=8)
Active buyers
(n=27)
Passive buyers
(n=22)
Mix buyers
(n=7)
Mean 6,29% -9,18% 6,13% 9,84% 13,48%
Median 1,04% -5,18% 5,50% 1,74% 2,12%
Min -93,21% -93,21% -60,72% -13,04% -27,72%
Max 125,75% 40,93% 66,93% 125,75% 84,96%
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The average CAR for the whole sample was 4,5% and after adjusting for discounts and 
premiums it changed a lot, to 6,29%.  
5.3.2. Adjustment for outliers 
The skewness of the event study data is minimized by excluding outliers in order to have a 
better dependent variable for the regression. We define it as an event with an abnormal return 
that deviates more than two standard deviations from the mean of the sample. When analyzing 
the data, this definition can be applied to five events. A more detailed description of the 
outliers can be found in appendix H. After excluding these outliers, the sample consists of 59 
events and the adjusted data is presented in the table below. 
Table 8: CARadj after adjustment for outliers over the event window: ±1 day 
 
Degrees of freedom are calculated by taking the number of events -1. The significance level is divided into three different 
levels, t-statistics for 2-tailed test with different degrees of freedom: * - 10% level ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level. 
After adjusting for outliers, the CAR of the total sample changed a lot again. It changes from 
6,29% to 4,64% after the adjustment and the total sample is still significant at a 5% level. The 
big change is within the different buyer groups. Insider buyer changes from a very negative 
CAR of -9,18% to a more modest one of 2,87% after adjustments.  The CAR for the active 
buyers decreases from 6,13% to 5,82%. The CAR for both the passive buyers and the mixed 
buyers decrease heavily from 9,84% to 3,94% and 13,48% to 2,52%.  
5.4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND TESTS OF REGRESSION 
VARIABLES  
In this section the main regression variables will be evaluated by examining the quality of the 
gathered data. A normality and multicollinearity test are conducted.  
5.4.1. Normality test 
Firstly, the mean, median, minimum, maximum and the distribution of the variables are 
examined as it can be seen in the following table. 
Buyer All Insider buyer Active buyer Passive buyer Mixed
Degrees of free. 58 7 24 20 5
Var(meanCAR) 0,0004 0,0030 0,0013 0,0004 0,0056
CARmean 4,64% 2,87% 5,82% 3,94% 2,52%
T-statistics 2,3379 0,5258 1,6232 1,9289 0,3356
Significance level ** *
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics of the main regression variables 
 
The variables are: CARadj is the abnormal return adjusted for discount; firm size is the is firm size in millions of SEK 
measured by taking the stock price 30 days prior to the announcement times the number of outstanding shares; ln firm size is 
the is the logged firm size variable; issue size is the logged issue variable in millions of SEK; issue size is the proceeds from 
the private placements before deducting costs in millions of SEK; ln issue size is the logged issue variable in millions of 
SEK; issue divided by firm size is exactly what is says, the issue size divided by the firm value 30 days prior to the issue; ln 
issue div firm size is the logged variable of issue divided by firm size. 
For CARadj, the mean value is much higher than the median which indicates that most of the 
events are negative or close to zero. The high mean is the result of some high values that push 
up the value. The Jarque-Bera test rejects the null of normality for all variables meaning that 
none of the variables are normally distributed in the original test. After logging firm size, 
issue size and the issue divided by firm size, the probability improved from zero to a higher 
number. Taking logs makes the extreme values in the right tail much closer to the main 
density of the distribution. The effect in the left tail is basically the opposite, so the 
distributions become more symmetric. By doing so, ln issue size is closer to being normally 
distributed but for ln firm size and ln issue divided by firm size, the Jarque-Bera test is still 
strongly rejected. Not having normally distributed variables is a limitation to the results but by 
using the logged variables instead, some of the problems will be mitigated.  
5.4.2. Multicollinearity test 
Before running the regression, all the included independent variables should be investigated 
for multicollinearity issues. The multicollinearity test is done to make sure that the 
independent variables are not correlated. The result from this test is presented in the table 
below. 
  
CARadj
FIRM SIZE 
(msek)
LN FIRM 
SIZE
ISSUE SIZE 
(msek)
LN ISSUE 
SIZE
ISSUE DIVIDED 
BY FIRM SIZE
LN ISSUE DIV 
FIRM SIZE
 Mean 4,73% 963,1 4,72 60,1 2,42 0,15 -2,30
 Median 0,87% 106,4 4,67 8,8 2,17 0,10 -2,31
 Maximum 48,04% 20 888,4 9,95 1 577,7 7,36 0,92 -0,08
 Minimum -27,72% 1,8 0,59 0,3 -1,39 0,00 -5,38
 Std, Dev, 0,16 3 389,98 1,94 208,46 1,79 0,16 1,02
 Skewness 0,82 4,99 0,42 6,73 0,21 2,53 -0,61
 Kurtosis 3,43 27,40 3,33 49,29 2,82 11,47 3,92
 Jarque-Bera 7,07 1 708,41 1,97 5 712,19 0,54 239,22 5,78
 Probability 3% 0% 37% 0% 77% 0% 6%
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Table 10: Correlation matrix 
The significance level is divided into three different levels: * - 10% level ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level. 
There is a high correlation of 85% between the logged variable of firm size and issue size 
which is significant at a 1% level. Given this high correlation, it does not make sense to 
include both variables in the regression since the regression can become very sensitive to 
small changes in its specification. Additionally, it makes it more difficult to make reliable 
overall inferences from the regression. We believe that issue size has a bigger explanation 
factor for the market reaction to the private placement announcement.  Since issue size is also 
more normally distributed, this variable is kept.  
5.5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
After data adjustments and descriptive tests, in this section we will focus on the multiple 
regression results presented in table 11. This allows us to study more closely the variables and 
their effect on the abnormal returns. The dependent variable in this regression is the 
cumulative adjusted abnormal return, CARadj, taken from the event study. In addition to the 
insider and active buyer, we include several control variables to filter out any other 
information that is released in an announcement. 
5.5.1. Initial regression output 
As a result of adjustments to the normality and multicollinearity tests, the following 
regression specification is used. The regression results are presented in table 11. 
CARadj = αi + β1*active buyer + β2*insider buyer + β3*LN(issue size) +  
β4*LN(issue size/firm size) + β5*financial restructuring + β6*regulated market + εi 
 
Correlations
LN FIRM 
SIZE
LN ISSUE 
SIZE
LN ISSUE DIV 
FIRM SIZE 
INSIDER 
BUYER 
ACTIVE 
BUYER 
FIN 
RESTR 
REG 
MARKET 
LN FIRM SIZE 1,00
LN ISSUE SIZE 0,85*** 1,00
LN ISSUE DIV FIRM SIZE -0,40*** 0,13 1,00
INSIDER BUYER -0,18 -0,19 0,01 1,00
ACTIVE BUYER -0,03 0,05 0,15 -0,31** 1,00
FIN RESTR -0,17 -0,18 0,01 -0,05 0,08 1,00
REG MARKET 0,54*** 0,46*** -0,22* 0,15 -0,11 -0,19 1,00
(15) 
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Table 11: Regression of abnormal returns for private placements in Sweden 2009-2014 
 
The dependent variable is the market-model cumulative abnormal stock returns from 1 day before to 1 day following the 
initial public announcement of the placement adjusted for discounts. The main variables of interest are insider buyer and 
active buyer. The omitted groups are passive and mixed buyers.  
The output from the OLS regression indicates that the coefficient for insider buyers is 
negative compared to the base group consisting of mixed and passive buyers while it is 
positive for active buyers. The coefficient for the regulated market (4,91%) and for the issue 
size divided by firm size (1,83%) are positive while the coefficients for the issue size (-
1,08%) and for financial restructuring (-0,30%) are negative. However, none of the variables 
in this regression are significant. This means that we should not pay too much attention on the 
exact numbers but instead we interpret if the coefficients are positive or negative. It can be 
seen that the fit of the regression to the data is very low since R
2
 is only of 2,8% meaning that 
only about 3% of the variations are explained by the regression.  
5.5.2. Heteroskedasticity test 
In order to challenge the regression, the heteroskedasticity test is done which investigates 
whether the variance of errors is constant. The test uses the squared residuals as a proxy for 
the variance of the error terms. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is that the 
coefficients for the independent variables are jointly zero. If the test statistics is greater than 
the critical value, the null hypothesis can be rejected. The following table shows our results. 
Table 12: Heteroskedasity Test (White Test) 
 
The test is rejected and due to this we can suspect that we have heteroskedasticity issues 
meaning that the standard errors could be too big or too small and therefore leading to 
incorrect inferences. To mitigate this, the variables can be logged or the standard errors can be 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Since all non-dummy variables are already logged, the 
Dependent variable: CARadj Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
Insider buyer -3,27% -0,447 0,66
Active buyer 2,30% 0,504 0,62
LN (issue size) -1,08% -0,732 0,47
LN (issue size divided by firm size) 1,83% 0,805 0,42
Regulated market 4,91% 0,808 0,42
Financial restructuring -0,30% -0,066 0,95
Intercept 9,84% 1,248 0,22
R-squared 0,028
Observations 59
F-statistic 2,706     Prob, F(22,36) 0,0039
Obs*R-squared 36,766     Prob, Chi-Square(22) 0,0251
Scaled explained SS 40,057     Prob, Chi-Square(22) 0,0106
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standard errors will be corrected. When doing so, the results do not differ that much from the 
original regression. More details on this test can be found in appendix I. 
5.5.3. Regression robustness tests 
To further challenge the regression, since all the variables were insignificant in the initial 
regression, several scenarios will be tested. While constructing the model used for testing our 
hypotheses, several assumptions were made. In this section, multiple regressions are run with 
a slight modification in order to test the regression for robustness. The following table gives 
an overview on the different regressions. 
Table 13: Regression of abnormal returns for private placements in Sweden 2009-2014 
 
The significance level is divided into three different levels and marked in the table with: * for 10% level ** for 5% level; *** 
for 1% level. 
Most of the regressions are consistent with the results from the initial regression. Three 
findings are noteworthy. Firstly, there are still no significant results for the buyers. The only 
result which is consistent for all regressions is the insider buyer, having a negative coefficient 
in relation to the base group. Secondly, using a different event window decreases the p-value 
for most variables and the results are similar to the initial regression. Thirdly, the results were 
heavily affected by the excluded outliers especially for the active buyer. Below follows a 
motivation for testing the different scenarios and a description per scenario of the results 
compared to the initial regression. 
  
Dependent variable: 
CARadj Coefficient Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
Insider buyer -3,3% 0,66 -7,1% 0,33 -10,9% 0,19 -20,6% 0,11 -6,0% 0,42 -4,4% 0,57 -9,0% 0,22
Active buyer 2,3% 0,62 0,0% 0,99 0,0% 0,99 -5,0% 0,54 0,7% 0,88 1,1% 0,82 4,4% 0,34
Mixed buyer -4,5% 0,58
LN (issue size) -1,1% 0,47 -2,4% 0,12 -1,4% 0,34 -0,2% 0,93 -2,0% 0,19 -1,2% 0,44 -1,4% 0,33
LN (issue size divided 
by firm size) 1,8% 0,42 4,3%* 0,09 1,8% 0,43 0,9% 0,81 2,9% 0,25 2,2% 0,36 1,4% 0,53
Firm size
Regulated market 4,9% 0,42 7,8% 0,20 8,0% 0,22 1,6% 0,88 6,8% 0,26 4,7% 0,45 7,6% 0,21
Financial restructuring -0,3% 0,95 1,7% 0,70 0,4% 0,94 0,1% 0,99 0,9% 0,84 -0,1% 0,99 -1,2% 0,79
Intercept 9,8% 0,22 19,5%** 0,03 11,2% 0,16 13,2% 0,33 15,25%* 0,10 12,0% 0,18 7,6% 0,33
R-squared 0,03 0,09 0,06 0,05 0,06 0,03 0,08
Adjusted R-squared -0,08 -0,03 -0,07 -0,05 -0,07 -0,10 -0,03
Prob(F-statistic) 0,956 0,616 0,824 0,819 0,828 0,967 0,635
Observations 59 54 51 64 53 59 59
Another event 
window
Initial regression
Excl financial 
industry
Multiple 
announcements
Including 
outliers
Excluding mixed 
buyers
Change base 
group
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5.5.3.1. Excluding financial industry 
The first test excludes financial institutions since it is argued that financial institutions work 
under different business circumstances. In our sample, there are five events of financial 
institutions announcing a private placement. The result is mostly consistent with the initial 
regression. The most noteworthy finding is that the coefficient for active buyer is now 0% 
compared to 2,3% in the initial regression and that would indicate that there is no difference 
between the base group and active buyers. This regression has one significant variable which 
is the logged variable of issue size divided by company size.  
5.5.3.2. Excluding multiple SEO announcements 
When the company announces a private placement, sometimes they publish that another issue 
type is done simultaneously. As explained in the empirical findings, SEO announcements lead 
in general to negative market reactions. In case that a rights issue or a public issue is 
announced at the same time as a private placement, the announcement effect of the private 
placements could be affected. By challenging our regression for such events, we exclude the 
events with multiple issue types at the same time. This is consistent with Wruck (1989) who 
does the same in her study. The results are very similar to the initial regression and still no 
significant variables. The active buyer coefficient is 0%, and the insider buyer coefficient is  
-10,9%  compared to -3,3% in the initial regression.  
5.5.3.3. Including outliers 
When excluding outliers, our assumption was that they would disturb the results of the 
regression and might lead to faulty coefficients. It can clearly be stated that including outliers 
leads to very different results. The biggest difference is that in this regression the active buyer 
category has a coefficient of -5% compared to the initial regression where it is 2,3%. This 
would lead to a different conclusion when testing the hypothesis.  
5.5.3.4. Excluding mixed buyers 
According to Yeh and Ma (2012) only main buyer categories should be included in order to 
obtain more accurate results. The main categories are insider, active and passive buyers. To 
test if this changed our regression output, the six events with mixed buyers were excluded. 
Compared to our initial regression the results only changed for the intercept which is now 
significant at a 10% level. 
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5.5.3.5. Change of the base group 
In our model we included both the mixed group and passive buyers in the base group of the 
regression. With this test we want to investigate whether there is a difference by only 
including passive investors in the base group. The result shows that the mixed group has a 
negative coefficient and would then result in a lower abnormal return than the passive buyers. 
For both insider and active buyers the results are consistent with the initial regression. 
5.5.3.6. Other event window as dependent variable 
The same event window, namely (-1,0), that was used by Barclay et al. (2007) will be applied 
to our regression. We will not test the event window of (-3,0) that Wruck (1989) and Hertzel 
and Smith (1993) used since it does not produce significant results in our event study. The 
table with the different event windows can be found in the theoretical framework. Below the 
additional event study results are presented. 
Table 14: Cumulative abnormal returns for two new event windows 
 
The significance level is divided into three different levels: * - 10% level ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level. The number of 
events is 59, i.e. the outliers identified earlier are excluded here as well. 
The results of using a different event window are that the p-values are lowered. The 
coefficients generate roughly the same results as in the initial regression that had much higher 
p-values. The result tells us that it makes sense to run the regression with other event windows 
than the ±1 day CARadj used in the initial regression. In the next section all significant event 
windows will be tested. 
5.5.4. Regression for all significant event windows 
In the table below the regression is presented for all the significant event windows from the 
event study. This is to investigate if the significance of the variables is changing depending on 
the number of days included. All dependent variables are adjusted for discounts. 
  
Event window
Variance
(mean CAR) CAR mean T-statistics
Significance 
level
CARadj 
mean
CAR -1, 0 0,000 3,11% 1,92 * 3,20%
CAR -3, 0 0,001 2,29% 1,00 2,38%
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Table 15: Cumulative abnormal returns for two new event windows 
 
The significance level is divided into three different levels: * - 10% level ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level.  
The results show that the insider buyer variable becomes significant for three of the larger 
event windows. The control variable, LN(issues size), generates significant results for the two 
largest windows and the intercept is also significant for some windows compared to the initial 
regression. By testing larger event windows the insider buyer variable shows statistically 
significant lower abnormal returns compared to passive and mixed buyers. By completing the 
description of the empirical results we can now move on to the analysis chapter. 
 
  
Dependent variable: 
CARadj 
(-1,1)
CARadj 
(0,1)
CARadj 
(-1,2)
CARadj 
(-2,2)
CARadj 
(-3,3)
CARadj 
(-4,4)
CARadj 
(-5,5)
CARadj 
(-6,6)
Coefficient Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Insider buyer -3,3% -0,2% -8,1% -8,4% -3,2% -16,64%* -22,12%** -22,71%*
Active buyer 2,3% 5,4% 3,7% 3,3% 8,1% 5,9% 5,6% 2,6%
LN (issue size) -1,1% -0,3% -1,2% -2,96%* -1,1% -2,5% -3,49%* -4,28%*
LN (issue size divided 
by firm size) 1,8% 0,0% 2,2% 3,9% 2,1% 3,0% 4,5% 3,4%
Regulated market 4,9% 3,6% 5,7% 11,13%* 5,8% 8,5% 8,9% 6,7%
Financial restructuring -0,3% -6,5% -7,2% -7,5% 0,1% -3,0% -6,4% -10,9%
Intercept 9,8% 2,4% 11,5% 18,38%** 7,0% 15,72%* 24,20%** 26,76%*
R-squared 0,03 -0,06 0,07 0,11 0,07 0,13 0,16 0,11
Adjusted R-squared -0,08 0,15 -0,04 0,01 -0,04 0,03 0,07 0,01
Prob(F-statistic) 0,956 0,373 0,678 0,399 0,719 0,287 0,143 0,373
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
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6. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter both the empirical results of the event study and the regression are analysed 
and set in a context. Similarities and differences of the results compared with the theoretical 
framework and previous empirical findings are identified and discussed. By doing so, the 
developed research hypotheses are either confirmed or rejected. 
6.1. ABNORMAL RETURNS  
The first part of the analysis relates the empirical results of the event study to the theoretical 
framework. By doing so, the first research hypothesis is answered. For this purpose the total 
sample and the different buyer groups are analysed separately. 
6.1.1. Event study results for total sample 
Our first research hypothesis H1 states that the announcement of private placements leads to 
positive short-term abnormal returns. As described in the empirical findings chapter, previous 
studies have resulted in positive short-term abnormal returns to private placements both in the 
US (Wruck, 1989; Hertzel & Smith, 1993) and in Sweden (Molin, 1996; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 
2005). However, the stock price reactions of previous studies differ heavily in magnitude. The 
table below sums up previous findings compared to the result of the event study in this thesis.  
Table 16: Comparing our results to previous findings of short-term AR 
 
The significance level is divided into three levels: * -10% level; ** -5% level; *** -1% level. 
Our event study results in the empirical results chapter show that there are positive abnormal 
returns for the event window (-1,1) of 4,64% for the whole sample which are statistically 
significant at a 5% significance level. Hypothesis H1 can thus be confirmed. By comparing 
the different event windows our cumulative abnormal returns can be compared to other 
studies to some extent. Nevertheless, it is difficult to compare the results since the different 
studies distinguish among other in sample size, firm characteristics and market settings. To 
improve comparability, the same methodology as the mentioned authors in table 15 has been 
applied to our sample. By doing so, the results become more comparable. Our findings for 
Authors Market Sample period Sample size CAR (-3,0) CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,0)
Wruck (1989) US 1979-1985 99 4,5%** - 1,9%*
Hertzel & Smith (1993) US 1980-1987 106 1,7%** - -
Molin (1996) Sweden 1986-1994 76 - 3,2%*** -
Cronqvist & Nilsson (2005) Sweden 1986-1999 136 - 7,3%*** -
Barclay et al. (2007) US 1979-1997 594 - - 1,7%***
Into & Treyer (2015) Sweden 2009-2014 59 3,11%* 4,64%** 2,29%
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CAR (-3,0) range between the previous studies which is likewise the case for CAR (-1,1). 
However, for CAR (-1,0) our findings are higher than those investigated by previous studies 
but also insignificant.  
6.1.2. Private placement buyers 
Information asymmetry and agency theory is explained by the research community to impact 
the short-term abnormal returns differently for each buyer group. By analysing the event 
study results and comparing them to the theories, a first step can be taken to investigate if the 
theoretical assumptions hold. 
Table 17: CAR after adjustment for outliers over the event window: ±1 day 
 
Degrees of freedom are calculated by taking the number of events -1. The significance level is divided into three different 
levels, t-statistics for 2-tailed test with different degrees of freedom: * - 10% level ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level. 
Active buyers show the highest average CAR (5,82%) while insider buyers (2,87%) and 
mixed buyers (2,52%) show the lowest ones. According to Barclay et al. (2007), positive 
results are expected for active buyers who are perceived more favourably by the market than 
passive buyers which is consistent with our results. Comparing our results for the passive 
buyers with those of Barclay et al. (2007), we find likewise that passive buyers have higher 
average CAR than insider buyers. Both Barclay et al. (2007) and we find that the passive 
buyer group is the only group showing significant results.  
Insiders together with the mixed buyers show the lowest abnormal returns among the different 
buyer categories. The low insider CAR is consistent with Barclay et al. (2007) which 
investigate  for insiders a result of -0,7%, however statistically insignificant. The portion of 
insiders is about the same in both studies, we have 14% insiders in our sample which is 
likewise the case for Barclay et al.’s (2007) sample with 13%. There are no previous results 
for mixed buyers on abnormal returns. Since we have insignificant results and a small sample, 
it makes it difficult to draw any general conclusions. The average CAR for the mixed buyers 
are the lowest (2,52%) in the whole sample which is a bit surprising since one could expect 
that the average CAR for mixed buyers is close to the average CAR of the whole sample 
(4,64%).  
Buyer All Insider buyer Active buyer Passive buyer Mixed
Degrees of free. 58 7 24 20 5
Var(meanCAR) 0,0004 0,0030 0,0013 0,0004 0,0056
CARmean 4,64% 2,87% 5,82% 3,94% 2,52%
T-statistics 2,3379 0,5258 1,6232 1,9289 0,3356
Significance level ** *
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Our results of the event study divided per buyer are a first indication that there are differences 
among the different buyer groups. In order to find out if the presented theories apply to this 
study, it is not enough to do only an event study. By analysing discounts and premiums, as 
well as regressions, more sophisticated insights can be gained.  
6.2. DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS  
Our results show that private placements are on average made at a premium to the stock price 
which contrasts previous studies such as those of Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993) 
and Barclay et al. (2007) who all find discounts. Our findings are not straightforward because 
the majority of the private placement buyers, 58% in our sample, gets a discount. When 
analysing the different buyer categories, Barclay et al. (2007) state that insiders can benefit 
from self-interested private placement deals by issuing private placements at a discount. 
However, our results do not confirm that since insiders pay on average a premium in our 
sample. Our results show that the active buyers pay more than the passive buyers which is 
however consistent with the theory.  
The effect from the discount or premium on the abnormal returns is filtered out in order to 
enable us to study the effect from the information asymmetry and agency theories on the AR 
for the different buyers. This is also done by Molin (1996) and Wruck (1989) but not by 
Barclay et al. (2007). By doing so, we add another dimension to Barclay et al.’s paper, which 
is one of the reference papers for this study.  
6.3. INTERPRETATION OF REGRESSION RESULTS 
This section is divided in two parts, to reject or confirm the second and third hypothesis. The 
first section evaluates if insider buyers have the lowest abnormal returns. The second section 
discusses if the active buyers have the highest abnormal returns. 
6.3.1. Insider buyers show the lowest abnormal returns 
The second hypothesis H2 states that insider buyers have lower abnormal returns than passive 
and mixed buyers. In our regression, we find that insider placements have the statistically 
significant lowest adjusted abnormal returns for larger event windows. This is confirming the 
hypothesis. When running the original regression for a narrow event window we do not get 
significant results. We challenged if the ±1 day event window was the most appropriate event 
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window to study the market’s reaction to different private placement buyers. By doing so and 
testing larger event windows as the dependent variable, significant results were obtained.  
The announcement effect to insider buyers is described in the theory as a mix between the 
positive reaction from the signalling theory from Leland and Pyle (1977) and negative 
reactions due to managerial entrenchment as described by Molin (1996) and Barclay et al. 
(2007). With our results in mind the market's reaction can best be explained by the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis stating that there is a risk for insider opportunism when private 
placements are directed to insiders. The theory is that they are trying to benefit from deal on 
the behalf of the current shareholders leading to a wealth transfer (Molin, 1996). The positive 
effect from Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signalling theory is weak. The theory highlights that 
when insiders increase ownership, it transfers a positive signal to the market. The negative 
impact in our regression of insider buyers compared to mixed and passive buyers does not 
support Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) convergence-of-interest theory. They argue that 
increased insider ownership leads to more aligned interests between managers and 
shareholders and therefore results in positive market reactions.  
6.3.2. Active buyers have insignificant results 
This section relates to the third hypothesis H3 stating that active buyers are expected to lead to 
higher abnormal returns than passive and mixed buyers. We do not find any significant results 
for the active buyers in the initial regression and due to this the hypothesis is rejected. Due to 
the insignificant results from the regression some robustness tests are done to challenge the 
model. The rejection of the hypothesis after the initial regression is strengthened by the mixed 
results in the robustness test. 
The third hypothesis is built on the monitoring hypothesis (Wruck, 1989) and the information 
hypothesis (Hertzel & Smith, 1993). The monitoring hypothesis (Wruck, 1989) states that the 
buyers in this category take an active role in the company, either by becoming a larger 
shareholder, a strategic partner or an investor with a long-term commitment. With these roles 
the buyer is in a position to monitor management (Wruck, 1989). The information hypothesis 
is when a well-informed investor invests in the company through a private placement, it 
transfers a positive sign to the market (Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Lee & Kocher, 2001). By 
rejecting our hypothesis, we conclude that these two theories provide weak evidence on the 
market's reaction to private placement announcement in the Swedish market environment. 
The weak support for the monitoring hypothesis and the information hypothesis is consistent 
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with Barclay et al.'s (2007) findings. Due to the high initial ownership concentration in the 
Swedish equity market, the private placement most likely will result in a decrease of 
ownership concentration rather than in an increase. This is why less weight should be put on 
the monitoring hypothesis as an explanatory hypothesis for the reaction of the market. 
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7. CONCLUSION  
This chapter sums up the main conclusions of this study. The research aims and the research 
objectives are firstly presented. Suggestions for future research on the studied topic are 
finally proposed.  
7.1. RESEARCH AIM AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis investigates the following research question: Is there a difference in the short-
term announcement effects of equity private placements depending on the investor’s 
involvement with the issuing firms in terms of information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts? 
To answer this question, an event study methodology was used to get first findings on the 
abnormal returns for private placements for the total sample and for the investigated buyer 
groups: insider buyer, active buyer, passive buyer and mixed. We find positive abnormal 
returns for the total sample of the private placements. As a result, the first hypothesis that the 
announcement of private placements leads to positive short-term abnormal returns, can be 
confirmed. Different abnormal returns for the different buyer groups were investigated, 
among those the active buyers show the highest abnormal returns and the passive and mixed 
buyers the lowest ones.  
To filter out the pricing effects from the abnormal returns we adjust the abnormal returns for 
discounts and premiums. This allows to better evaluate how the different theories explain the 
abnormal returns. The adjusted abnormal return is then used as the dependent variable in a 
cross-sectional regression. The regression is used to control how other variables, besides the 
buyers, affect the abnormal returns.  
To answer our second hypothesis, stating that insider buyers have lower abnormal returns 
than passive and mixed buyers, we analyze the results from the regression. What we find is, 
that insider placements have the lowest abnormal returns compared to passive and mixed 
buyers. The second hypothesis can therefore be confirmed. The results are explained by the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis pointing out that there is a risk for insider opportunism 
when private placements are purchased by insiders (Molin, 1996). Our findings show weak 
support for the signaling theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977) and for the convergence of interest 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
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The third hypothesis states that active buyers lead to higher abnormal returns than passive and 
mixed buyers to a private placement. We find conflicting results in our initial regression 
compared to the robustness checks and due to this the hypothesis is rejected. By not being 
able to confirm it, we consider that the monitoring hypothesis and the information hypothesis 
support weak evidence to the market's reaction to private placement announcement in the 
Swedish market environment. According to the monitoring hypothesis, a private placement 
increases the ownership concentration. The weak support for the monitoring hypothesis can 
be explained by the high initial ownership concentration for the Swedish market.  
We come to the conclusion that the type of investor in a private placement has an effect on 
how the market reacts to the announcement. The announcement of an insider buyer results in 
a low positive abnormal return. We cannot confirm that active buyers result in the highest 
abnormal returns compared to the others. The market reactions are therefore best supported by 
the managerial entrenchment hypothesis whereas the information and monitoring hypotheses 
gain weak support.  
This study investigates how the relationship of the private placement investors with the 
issuing company affects the short-term market reactions in Sweden. By rejecting that the 
active investor gets the highest abnormal returns we dismiss that the monitoring hypothesis 
explains the market’s reaction when the initial ownership is high, which is the case for 
Sweden. Therefore the managerial entrenchment hypothesis is concluded to provide a better 
explanation to the abnormal returns in this specific market setting. 
7.2. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research is recommended for two different dimensions: 
1. The different buyer categories of private placement buyers have not been much studied 
except by Barclay et al. (2007) in the US. According to Bortoletti et al. (2008), SEOs are 
particularly conducted as rights offerings or private placements for stock markets outside the 
USA. Therefore, further research would be interesting in order to test the theories for different 
market environments. By doing so, stronger evidence can be found for market reactions.  
2. Our empirical data shows that companies do not only address one type of buyer in private 
placements. Since mixed buyers have not been investigated a lot, it is recommended to 
include this private placement buyer categorization in the research.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Seasoned Equity Offerings in Sweden 2008-2014 per issue type 
 
Definitions used for dividing the sample into the different issue types. 
 
 
Issue type 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Grand Total
Rights offering 46 72 63 79 103 107 95 565
IPO 15 14 29 19 12 19 61 169
Private placement 3 5 12 30 43 35 128
Public offering 1 3 5 9 19 27 36 100
Cancelled 3 1 4 8
Grand Total 65 92 102 119 165 196 231 970
Definition Description
Rights offering To current shareholders with precendence right to the new issued shares
IPO No trading of the stock have been performed on the mentioned market
Private placement To one or a few new shareholders
Public offering To current and new shareholders eithout precendence right for the current
Cancelled Announced issues that later was cancelled
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Appendix B: Detailed data about the gathered private placements 2009-2014 
 
 
Year Company Industry Event day Buyer
Firm size 
(mSEK)
Issue size 
(mSEK)
Issue size/
Firm size Motivation for issue Stock exchange
# shares 
issued
# shares 
before 
placement
Fraction 
placed
P-30 stock 
price 30 days 
prior event
P-1 price 1 
day before 
event
P0 - price 
on event 
day
Issue 
price Discount
Rebate 
adjuster
2009 Heart of Brands AB Fashion/Clothes 2009-05-11 Active 13 0 3% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 1 250 000 22 770 677 5% 0,57 0,36 0,36 0,30 17% 0,009
2009 Oasmia Pharmaceutical AB Pharmaceutical 2009-11-05 Passive 941 43 5% New Investments NGM Equity 1 720 000 35 892 858 5% 26,23 24,51 23,85 25,00 -5% -0,002
2009 Rottneros AB Industrial
2009-10-12
Active
528 200
38% Financial restructuring
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
444 444 444
1 089 494 425 29% 0,49 5,94 6,79 4,50 34% 0,157
2010 BioInvent International AB Pharmaceutical
2010-01-14
Passive
1 514 150
10% New Investments
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
5 434 800
55 660 889 9% 27,20 28,80 27,90 27,60 1% 0,001
2010 Clean Oil Technology AB Industrial 2010-12-01 Mixed 44 17 38% New Investments Nordic MTF 20 000 000 56 907 158 26% 0,78 0,85 0,84 0,85 -1% -0,004
2010
Cws Comfort Window 
System AB Industrial
2010-11-23
Passive
10 2
20% Financial restructuring
Aktietorget 300 000
5 688 200 5% 1,75 2,75 4,90 6,80 -39% -0,036
2010 CybAero AB Industrial 2010-10-11 Insider 28 3 9% New partner First North 2 500 000 26 964 238 8% 1,05 0,93 0,92 1,00 -9% -0,008
2010
World Class Seagull 
International AB_2 Services
2010-11-23
Active
64 19
29% Financial restructuring
First North 13 214 286
44 544 310 23% 1,43 1,14 1,12 1,40 -25% -0,073
2011
Confidence International 
AB Data/IT
2011-02-22
Insider
30 3
9% New Investments
NGM Equity 414 815
4 203 846 9% 7,20 0,02 0,02 0,02 -10% -0,010
2011 Cryptzone AB Data/IT 2011-06-01 Active 44 17 39% New Investments First North 200 000 000 862 575 916 19% 0,05 44,43 50,77 85,00 -67% -0,179
2011 Fingerprint Cards AB_1 Data/IT
2011-04-11
Passive
343 28
8% New Investments
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
4 000 000
39 669 586 9% 8,65 7,85 8,00 7,00 13% 0,013
2011
Selena Oil & Gas Holding 
AB Energy
2011-07-15
Mixed
409 8
2% New Investments
First North 1 600 000
41 347 500 4% 9,90 9,60 9,20 5,00 46% 0,017
2011 SRAB Shipping AB Industrial 2011-01-20 Mixed 129 33 26% Financial restructuring First North 6 600 000 000 6 454 546 000 51% 0,02 20,00 10,00 5,00 50% 0,256
2011 TracTechnology AB Data/IT 2011-12-22 Passive 64 2 2% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 806 130 37 702 269 2% 1,70 1,32 1,30 1,98 -53% -0,011
2011
World Class Seagull 
International AB_1 Services
2011-12-20
Insider
39 19
49% Financial restructuring
First North 23 750 000
57 758 595 29% 0,67 0,68 0,68 0,80 -18% -0,073
2012 AdOperator AB Media 2012-07-13 Active 4 0 11% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 262 069 1 755 000 13% 2,49 2,38 2,38 1,90 20% 0,030
2012 Africa Oil Corporation Commodity 2012-11-28 Passive 15 808 1 578 10% New Investments First North 30 000 000 229 099 162 12% 69,00 56,25 55,50 52,59 5% 0,007
2012 Deflamo AB Industrial 2012-03-26 Passive 36 3 7% New Investments Aktietorget 2 272 727 34 086 516 6% 1,05 9,69 10,15 11,00 -8% -0,006
2012 EasyFill AB Industrial 2012-11-26 Insider 36 6 16% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 3 138 889 38 784 329 7% 0,93 1,47 1,37 1,80 -31% -0,024
2012 ExeoTech Invest AB Telecomm 2012-11-12 Active 79 2 2% Financial restructuring Nordic MTF 400 000 16 137 018 2% 4,90 4,50 4,05 4,50 -11% -0,002
2012 Fingerprint Cards AB_2 Data/IT 2012-12-12 Passive 255 36 14% New Investments First North 4 197 674 43 609 586 9% 5,85 8,60 8,85 8,60 3% 0,003
2012 Hammar Invest AB Industrial 2012-01-05 Active 250 7 3% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 29 200 000 581 092 254 5% 0,43 0,27 0,31 0,25 19% 0,011
2012 Invisio Communications AB Data/IT
2012-04-20
Passive
106 8
7% Financial restructuring
First North 2 500 000
33 783 784 7% 3,15 3,00 2,90 3,10 -7% -0,005
2012 Lyyn AB Data/IT 2012-09-10 Insider 21 1 5% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 2 000 000 23 374 357 8% 0,90 100,00 35,00 50,00 -43% -0,013
2012 Mavshack AB Media 2012-08-28 Mixed 1 719 5 0% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 199 900 000 148 149 206 57% 11,60 0,58 0,78 0,54 31% 0,558
2012 Melker Schörling AB Finance
2012-11-19
Passive
20 888 125
1% New Investments
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
615 764
118 481 831 1% 176,30 182,50 181,90 203,00 -12% -0,001
2012
Mineral Invest 
International MII AB Commodity
2012-06-01
Active
124 115
92% New Investments
Aktietorget 478 333 333
478 333 333 50% 0,26 0,32 0,31 0,24 23% 0,219
2012 Net Gaming Europe AB Services 2012-01-03 Active 5 2 41% New Investments Aktietorget 6 666 667 12 514 802 35% 0,43 0,26 0,42 0,33 21% 0,183
2012 NFO Drives AB Industrial 2012-02-03 Passive 44 6 13% New Investments Nordic MTF 18 500 000 138 250 210 12% 0,32 0,35 0,37 0,32 14% 0,019
2012 Skåne-möllan AB Food 2012-09-19 Active 400 36 9% New Investments First North 100 000 1 000 000 9% 399,50 370,00 370,00 360,00 3% 0,003
2012 Tethys Oil AB Commodity 2012-05-10 Passive 1 749 100 6% Unknown First North 2 500 000 32 543 750 7% 53,75 44,50 44,60 40,00 10% 0,008
2012
Thenberg & Kinde 
Fondkommission AB Finance
2012-03-21
Mixed
2 1
50% Financial restructuring
Aktietorget 2 934 000
15 890 982 16% 0,11 0,12 0,12 0,31 -157% -0,290
2012 Trig Media Group AB Media 2012-02-22 Active 34 8 25% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 127 250 000 708 000 000 15% 0,05 0,73 0,73 1,26 -72% -0,129
2012 Vinovo AB Finance 2012-05-25 Active 137 14 10% New partner First North 4 362 640 43 626 400 9% 3,13 2,80 3,25 3,25 0% 0,000
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Appendix B: Detailed data about the gathered private placements 2009-2014 (cont.) 
 
Stock prices – all prices are the closing prices in SEK 
Offer price – Have been adjusted for later stock splits after the issue so that discounts could be calculated 
Discount = (Price on event day-issue price)/ Price on event day 
Rebate adjuster = AR0+(Issued shares/Shares before issue) * ((P0-Issue price)/P-1)
Year Company Industry Event day Buyer
Firm size 
(mSEK)
Issue size 
(mSEK)
Issue size/
Firm size Motivation for issue Stock exchange
# shares 
issued
# shares 
before 
placement
Fraction 
placed
P-30 stock 
price 30 days 
prior event
P-1 price 1 
day before 
event
P0 - price 
on event 
day
Issue 
price Discount
Rebate 
adjuster
2013 Active Biotech AB Pharmaceutical
2013-03-06
Active
4 015 270
7% Financial restructuring
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
6 000 000
68 923 582 8% 58,25 48,80 54,00 45,00 17% 0,016
2013 Aerocrine AB Pharmaceutical
2013-04-30
Passive
1 751 95
5% Financial restructuring
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
8 625 000
145 956 405 6% 12,00 11,35 12,00 11,00 8% 0,005
2013 Altero AB Industrial 2013-02-08 Active 4 1 20% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 4 674 999 26 436 122 15% 0,13 0,12 0,17 0,15 12% 0,030
2013 Beowulf Mining plc_1 Commodity 2013-07-10 Active 148 42 28% New Investments Aktietorget 66 190 476 175 800 289 27% 0,84 0,68 0,67 0,63 6% 0,022
2013 Botnia Exploration AB Commodity 2013-06-05 Active 33 6 19% New Investments Aktietorget 11 330 000 49 206 093 19% 0,68 0,57 0,58 0,55 5% 0,012
2013 Dignitana AB Pharmaceutical 2013-09-18 Passive 185 14 7% Financial restructuring First North 900 000 10 778 645 8% 17,20 16,60 17,80 15,00 16% 0,014
2013 Episurf Medical AB Pharmaceutical 2013-04-24 Passive 155 5 3% New partner First North 144 928 3 452 783 4% 45,00 61,50 61,25 34,50 44% 0,018
2013 Latvian Forest Company AB Agriculture
2013-07-31
Passive
34 3
8% New Investments
Aktietorget 412 037
5 061 649 8% 6,77 6,67 6,62 6,65 0% 0,000
2013 MedicPen AB Pharmaceutical 2013-09-13 Passive 28 5 18% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 8 500 000 40 476 190 17% 0,69 0,90 1,94 0,60 69% 0,313
2013 Moberg Derma AB Pharmaceutical
2013-07-02
Active
347 36
10% New Investments
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
1 080 000
10 812 572 9% 32,10 32,30 34,50 33,54 3% 0,003
2013
NeuroVive Pharmaceutical 
AB Pharmaceutical
2013-11-21
Passive
372 35
9% New Investments
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
2 500 000
19 159 046 12% 19,40 19,80 18,10 14,00 23% 0,027
2013
New Equity Venture 
International AB Finance
2013-02-14
Active
18 3
18% New Investments
First North 165 000
1 276 507 11% 14,05 17,00 16,70 20,00 -20% -0,025
2013 Paynova AB Data/IT 2013-08-28 Insider 29 3 10% New partner NGM Equity 8 000 000 87 049 545 8% 0,33 0,39 0,41 0,37 10% 0,009
2013 Recyctec Holding AB Industrial 2013-11-29 Active 141 1 0% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 60 500 10 954 620 1% 12,90 10,10 10,05 10,79 -7% 0,000
2013 Star Vault AB Data/IT 2013-05-23 Active 4 1 24% New Investments Aktietorget 4 169 859 33 704 690 11% 0,12 0,10 0,10 0,23 -130% -0,161
2013
TrustBuddy International 
AB Finance
2013-02-11
Active
72 9
12% New Investments
First North 8 000 000
72 000 000 10% 1,00 0,96 1,00 1,10 -10% -0,012
2013 VJ Since 1890 Sverige AB Retail 2013-02-11 Passive 5 0 5% New partner Aktietorget 2 500 000 128 550 000 2% 0,04 0,12 0,17 0,10 41% 0,011
2014 Amnode AB Industrial 2014-11-28 Insider 22 2 9% New Investments Aktietorget 666 667 4 951 717 12% 4,43 2,63 2,63 3,00 -14% -0,019
2014 Beowulf Mining plc_2 Commodity 2014-08-21 Mixed 118 18 15% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 53 333 333 282 820 560 16% 0,42 0,37 0,36 0,34 6% 0,011
2014 Brighter AB Pharmaceutical 2014-01-23 Active 121 25 21% New Investments Aktietorget 3 571 429 11 897 480 23% 10,18 15,97 15,13 7,00 54% 0,153
2014 Cavotec SA Industrial
2014-09-12
Active
2 542 189
7% New partner
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
7 138 780
71 397 220 9% 35,60 22,00 27,30 26,50 3% 0,004
2014 Dome Energy AB Commodity 2014-03-21 Active 203 23 11% New Investments Aktietorget 2 000 000 17 234 745 10% 11,80 11,90 13,00 11,50 12% 0,015
2014 Eurocine Vaccines AB Pharmaceutical 2014-02-11 Active 85 8 9% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 1 176 371 11 899 539 9% 7,12 6,74 8,43 6,50 23% 0,028
2014 Karo Bio AB Pharmaceutical
2014-03-18
Insider
342 7
2% New partner
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
15 000 000
495 947 367 3% 0,69 1,17 1,08 0,47 56% 0,016
2014
Karolinska Development 
AB Pharmaceutical
2014-11-05
Active
697 63
9% New Investments
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
4 846 154
48 538 404 9% 14,35 13,60 16,10 13,00 19% 0,023
2014 Mobile Loyalty Holding AB Data/IT 2014-09-25 Passive 33 6 18% Financial restructuring Aktietorget 14 750 000 77 105 542 16% 0,43 0,40 0,40 0,40 0% 0,000
2014
Precio Systemutveckling 
AB Data/IT
2014-08-27
Passive
58 2
4% New Investments
First North 400 000
7 489 546 5% 7,75 7,90 7,25 6,20 14% 0,007
2014 Rejlers AB Services
2014-02-19
Passive
1 079 85
8% New Investments
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm
900 000
11 421 721 7% 94,50 100,50 103,00 94,50 8% 0,007
2014 Respiratorius AB Pharmaceutical 2014-01-30 Active 52 9 17% New Investments Aktietorget 15 000 000 106 708 423 12% 0,49 0,63 0,67 0,60 10% 0,016
2014
Xtranet Gruppen i 
Stockholm AB Data/IT
2014-01-17
Mixed
5 2
39% New partner
Aktietorget 1 860 000
5 212 692 26% 0,91 1,00 0,87 1,00 -15% -0,046
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Appendix C: Abnormal return calculations 
  
Company Alpha Beta σεi^2
CAR 
0
CAR 
(0,1)
CAR 
(-1,1)
CAR
(-1,2)
CAR 
(-2,2)
CAR 
(-3,3)
CAR 
(-4,4)
CAR 
(-5,5)
CAR 
(-6,6)
CAR 
(-7,7)
CAR 
(-8,8)
CAR 
(-9,9)
CAR 
(-10,10)
Active Biotech AB 0,00 0,88 0,001 11% 19% 19% 24% 23% 24% 23% 20% 23% 26% 23% 21% 22%
AdOperator AB -0,01 -0,50 0,009 1% -64% -64% 2% 3% -23% -21% -21% -21% -20% -18% -16% -17%
Aerocrine AB 0,00 0,42 0,001 6% 4% 2% 2% -1% 1% -2% -1% -14% -15% -15% -12% -10%
Africa Oil Corporation 0,01 1,21 0,002 -2% -7% -8% -9% -33% -40% -42% -45% -45% -50% -52% -57% -65%
Altero AB -0,01 2,51 0,072 31% 33% 35% 35% 36% -6% 0% 10% 19% 17% 23% 58% 4%
Amnode AB 0,00 -0,41 0,003 0% 43% 43% 29% 29% 29% -12% -11% 3% 2% -36% -51% -52%
Beowulf Mining plc_2 0,00 -0,04 0,002 -1% -7% -13% -16% -23% -12% -18% -10% -13% -12% -14% -15% -14%
Beowulf Mining plc_1 0,00 1,00 0,003 -1% -7% -8% 4% 4% -1% -4% -4% -7% -10% -7% -1% -7%
BioInvent International AB 0,00 0,49 0,000 -4% -2% 0% 1% -1% -5% -9% -8% -1% 7% 5% 6% 1%
Botnia Exploration AB 0,00 -0,29 0,005 1% 5% 0% -19% -25% -24% -3% -9% -22% -20% -22% -28% -40%
Brighter AB 0,00 0,52 0,004 -5% -14% -2% 5% 7% 35% 36% 45% 40% 51% 47% 31% 15%
Cavotec SA 0,00 0,63 0,001 21% 21% 17% 18% 16% 10% 8% 5% 8% 9% 10% 9% 5%
Clean Oil Technology AB 0,00 0,30 0,002 -2% -1% 3% -5% 3% 2% 4% 5% 8% 3% 23% 17% 17%
Confidence International AB 0,00 0,06 0,039 0% 13% 13% 11% 11% 7% 3% 0% 9% 7% 8% -6% 6%
Cryptzone AB 0,00 0,05 0,004 13% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 31% 18% 16% 32% 19% 4%
Cws Comfort Window System AB 0,00 1,48 0,011 61% 39% 40% 40% 43% -7% 16% 50% 111% 74% 56% 39% 40%
CybAero AB 0,00 0,25 0,004 -1% 3% 1% -2% -3% 2% 9% 4% 21% 4% 33% 45% 24%
Deflamo AB 0,00 -0,01 0,003 5% 6% 6% 7% 4% 12% 16% 13% 7% 7% 10% 11% 7%
Dignitana AB 0,00 0,14 0,001 7% 0% -1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 2% 1% 2% 0% -6% 3%
Dome Energy AB 0,01 0,69 0,002 8% 7% 8% 8% 7% 3% 0% -5% -9% -12% -14% -18% -17%
EasyFill AB 0,00 0,06 0,005 -7% -6% -3% -3% -2% -5% -5% -8% -23% -8% -11% -26% -23%
Episurf Medical AB 0,00 0,14 0,002 -1% -1% -3% 0% 0% 1% 2% 1% -1% 3% 4% 9% -2%
Eurocine Vaccines AB 0,00 0,54 0,003 22% 22% 26% 41% 46% 71% 66% 47% 49% 54% 58% 58% 47%
ExeoTech Invest AB 0,00 0,70 0,003 -10% -4% -4% -7% -11% -10% -3% -7% -3% -9% -10% -5% 6%
Fingerprint Cards AB_2 0,00 0,38 0,003 3% 8% 6% 11% 8% 8% 16% 22% 47% 35% 37% 42% 48%
Fingerprint Cards AB_1 0,00 1,30 0,001 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 4% 3% 8% 6% 4% 2% 1% -9%
Hammar Invest AB -0,01 0,60 0,075 15% 16% -3% -16% -16% -19% -6% 27% 38% 39% 23% -7% -10%
Heart of Brands AB -0,01 1,24 0,022 3% 6% 5% 10% 11% 8% 11% -5% -1% -6% 12% 11% 1%
Invisio Communications AB -0,01 -0,19 0,004 -3% -1% -1% 0% 0% 7% 11% 15% 12% 9% 8% 7% 5%
Karo Bio AB 0,00 0,71 0,002 -9% -11% -13% -18% -20% -24% -33% -32% -31% -33% -22% -19% -9%
Karolinska Development AB 0,00 0,32 0,001 17% 17% 23% 26% 30% 37% 52% 52% 42% 45% 49% 33% 54%
Latvian Forest Company AB 0,00 0,31 0,001 -1% 3% 0% -2% -2% 1% 1% 0% -5% -4% -6% 7% 7%
Lyyn AB 0,00 -0,01 0,005 -105% -92% -92% -95% -95% -52% -52% -42% -42% -42% -42% -51% -51%
Mavshack AB 0,00 -0,36 0,014 29% 29% 29% 29% 29% 29% 28% 28% 28% -1% 0% -1% 0%
MedicPen AB 0,00 -0,38 0,006 77% 84% 94% 87% 92% 88% 78% 68% 81% 106% 107% 95% 91%
Melker Schörling AB 0,00 1,23 0,000 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 2% 4% 6% 5% 7% 10% 10%
Mineral Invest International MII AB 0,00 0,42 0,007 -2% -1% 0% 0% 4% 13% 7% 12% 4% -1% -10% -2% -1%
Moberg Derma AB 0,00 0,76 0,001 7% 8% 5% 6% 5% 3% 2% 1% -1% 2% 4% 3% 1%
Mobile Loyalty Holding AB 0,00 0,45 0,008 1% -2% 4% 7% 7% 3% 3% -6% -1% 0% -5% -1% -1%
Net Gaming Europe AB 0,00 -0,32 0,010 48% 48% 49% 49% 68% 65% 65% 66% 67% -6% -6% -4% -3%
NeuroVive Pharmaceutical AB 0,00 0,32 0,001 -9% -17% -16% -11% -12% -16% -15% -15% -17% -21% -25% -24% -19%
New Equity Venture International AB 0,00 0,28 0,005 -1% 5% -1% 4% 7% 30% 18% 9% 9% 6% -4% -4% -2%
NFO Drives AB 0,00 0,35 0,003 5% 8% 2% 0% 2% 1% 14% 11% 15% 16% 13% 12% 33%
Oasmia Pharmaceutical AB 0,00 0,12 0,002 -3% -1% -2% -5% -1% -6% -8% -7% -11% -9% -12% -20% -20%
Paynova AB 0,00 -0,67 0,006 5% -3% -6% -9% 10% 5% -1% -2% -8% -5% -4% -1% -8%
Precio Systemutveckling AB 0,00 0,34 0,000 -9% 1% 1% -2% -3% -3% -1% -2% -5% -2% -2% -5% -12%
Recyctec Holding AB 0,00 0,87 0,006 0% -8% -9% -9% -16% -3% -3% -15% -14% -19% -27% -25% -30%
Rejlers AB 0,00 0,43 0,000 2% 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 12% 11% 8% 9% 5% 9% 8%
Respiratorius AB 0,00 0,33 0,003 6% 8% 5% 1% -2% -9% -12% 11% 7% 4% 23% 15% 20%
Rottneros AB 0,00 0,71 0,003 13% 12% 11% 8% 7% 4% 10% 6% 7% 9% 16% 21% 23%
Selena Oil & Gas Holding AB 0,00 -0,40 0,011 -5% -6% -7% -9% -9% -8% -7% -7% -7% -7% -10% -25% -22%
Skåne-möllan AB 0,00 -0,10 0,001 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% -3% -3% -3% -3% -5% -5% -5% -5%
SRAB Shipping AB -0,01 1,67 0,034 -66% 3% 7% 9% 9% 10% 10% 13% 16% -53% 20% 23% 26%
Star Vault AB 0,00 -1,28 0,030 -3% -4% -3% 17% 17% 22% 21% 46% 46% 46% 45% 44% 36%
Tethys Oil AB 0,00 0,56 0,001 0% -3% 2% 5% 1% -1% -2% -2% -4% -5% -4% -9% 0%
Thenberg & Kinde Fondkommission AB 0,00 0,37 0,013 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 16% 16% -2% -3% -3% -4% -3%
TracTechnology AB 0,00 0,51 0,003 -2% 0% -2% 2% 11% -3% -3% -2% 17% -1% 13% 1% -19%
Trig Media Group AB 0,00 0,30 0,008 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -2% -2% -2% 16% -19% -1%
TrustBuddy International AB 0,00 0,31 0,003 4% -1% -1% 2% -1% 8% -1% -5% -4% -13% -6% -13% -14%
Vinovo AB 0,00 -0,25 0,005 15% 23% 23% 24% 23% 24% 24% 32% 32% 32% 20% 21% 39%
VJ Since 1890 Sverige AB 0,00 0,63 0,013 35% 29% 47% 47% 47% 34% 53% 87% 92% 58% 42% 101% 112%
World Class Seagull International AB_1 0,00 0,18 0,000 0% -5% -4% -5% -4% -4% -4% -6% -10% -10% -9% -9% -9%
World Class Seagull International AB_2 0,00 0,15 0,002 -1% -1% -1% -1% -2% -4% -5% -5% -8% -6% -1% 0% -4%
Xtranet Gruppen i Stockholm AB 0,00 -0,57 0,006 -13% -4% 25% 21% 29% 22% 24% 4% 0% -1% 3% 4% 9%
Variance (mean CAR) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,003
CAR mean 3,3% 4,0% 4,5% 5,6% 5,9% 5,4% 6,1% 7,7% 8,8% 4,6% 6,1% 4,6% 3,5%
T-statistics 1,48 2,55 2,37 2,51 2,37 1,83 1,83 2,10 2,21 1,08 1,34 0,95 0,69
Significance ** ** ** ** * * ** **
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Appendix D: Market model compared to market adjusted model 
 
*Market adjusted is the alternative model and around the event window it doesn’t differ that 
much from the market model. 
Difference in significance is indicated with a ‘Yes’ if it differs for the specified event window 
between the two models. 
Appendix E: Aggregated abnormal returns per buyer and day 
 
Model
Event window CAR mean T-stat Significance CAR mean T-stat Significance CAR mean Significance
CAR 0 3,3% 1,48 3,2% 1,43 0%
CAR 0, +1 4,0% 2,55 ** 3,9% 2,52 ** 0%
CAR +-1 4,5% 2,37 ** 4,3% 2,24 ** 0%
CAR -1,+2 5,6% 2,51 ** 5,0% 2,28 ** 1%
CAR +-2 5,9% 2,37 ** 5,2% 2,12 ** 1%
CAR +-3 5,4% 1,83 * 4,2% 1,42 1% Yes
CAR +-4 6,1% 1,83 * 4,7% 1,41 1% Yes
CAR +-5 7,7% 2,10 ** 6,3% 1,71 ** 1%
CAR +-6 8,8% 2,21 ** 7,2% 1,80 ** 2%
CAR +-7 4,6% 1,08 2,8% 0,66 2%
CAR +-8 6,1% 1,34 4,1% 0,89 2%
CAR +-9 4,6% 0,95 2,1% 0,44 2%
CAR +-10 3,5% 0,69 0,9% 0,18 3%
Market model abnormal returns Market adjusted abnormal returns* Difference
Days All placements Insider buyer Active buyer Passive buyer Mixed
-6 0,8% 1,3% 1,3% 1,1% -2,4%
-5 0,6% -0,1% -3,4% -0,7% -5,0%
-4 1,2% -4,8% 1,9% 2,3% 1,5%
-3 -0,8% -0,5% -0,7% -0,7% -1,3%
-2 0,3% 2,2% 0,3% -0,7% 1,1%
-1 0,6% -0,5% -0,6% 1,1% 3,7%
0 3,3% -14,6% 7,9% 7,8% -7,2%
1 0,7% 7,4% -2,5% -0,9% 9,1%
2 1,0% -3,7% 3,7% 0,4% -1,7%
3 0,3% -2,2% -0,9% 0,5% 0,1%
4 -0,5% 4,5% 1,4% -3,2% 1,7%
5 1,0% 0,2% 1,2% 1,1% 0,5%
6 0,3% 0,7% -2,2% 3,2% 0,2%
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Appendix F: Discounts and premiums sorted per market 
 
* A negative number indicates a premium and a positive number a discount 
Stock exchange Buyer Year Company
P0 - price on 
event day
Issue 
price Discount
Aktietorget Active 2009 Heart of Brands AB 0,36 0,30 17%
Aktietorget Active 2012 Hammar Invest AB 0,31 0,25 19%
Aktietorget Active 2012 Mineral Invest International MII AB 0,31 0,24 23%
Aktietorget Active 2012 Trig Media Group AB 0,73 1,26 -72%
Aktietorget Active 2013 Altero AB 0,17 0,15 12%
Aktietorget Active 2013 Beowulf Mining plc_1 0,67 0,63 6%
Aktietorget Active 2013 Botnia Exploration AB 0,58 0,55 5%
Aktietorget Active 2013 Recyctec Holding AB 10,05 10,79 -7%
Aktietorget Active 2013 Star Vault AB 0,10 0,23 -130%
Aktietorget Active 2014 Brighter AB 15,13 7,00 54%
Aktietorget Active 2014 Dome Energy AB 13,00 11,50 12%
Aktietorget Active 2014 Eurocine Vaccines AB 8,43 6,50 23%
Aktietorget Active 2014 Respiratorius AB 0,67 0,60 10%
Aktietorget Insider 2012 EasyFill AB 1,37 1,80 -31%
Aktietorget Insider 2014 Amnode AB 2,63 3,00 -14%
Aktietorget Mixed 2012 Thenberg & Kinde Fondkommission AB 0,12 0,31 -157%
Aktietorget Mixed 2014 Beowulf Mining plc_2 0,36 0,34 6%
Aktietorget Mixed 2014 Xtranet Gruppen i Stockholm AB 0,87 1,00 -15%
Aktietorget Passive 2010 Cws Comfort Window System AB 4,90 6,80 -39%
Aktietorget Passive 2011 TracTechnology AB 1,30 1,98 -53%
Aktietorget Passive 2012 Deflamo AB 10,15 11,00 -8%
Aktietorget Passive 2013 Latvian Forest Company AB 6,62 6,65 0%
Aktietorget Passive 2013 VJ Since 1890 Sverige AB 0,17 0,10 41%
Aktietorget Passive 2014 Mobile Loyalty Holding AB 0,40 0,40 0%
First North Active 2010 World Class Seagull International AB_2 1,12 1,40 -25%
First North Active 2011 Cryptzone AB 50,77 85,00 -67%
First North Active 2012 Skåne-möllan AB 370,00 360,00 3%
First North Active 2012 Vinovo AB 3,25 3,25 0%
First North Active 2013 New Equity Venture International AB 16,70 20,00 -20%
First North Active 2013 TrustBuddy International AB 1,00 1,10 -10%
First North Insider 2010 CybAero AB 0,92 1,00 -9%
First North Insider 2011 World Class Seagull International AB_1 0,68 0,80 -18%
First North Mixed 2011 Selena Oil & Gas Holding AB 9,20 5,00 46%
First North Mixed 2011 SRAB Shipping AB 10,00 5,00 50%
First North Passive 2012 Africa Oil Corporation 55,50 52,59 5%
First North Passive 2012 Fingerprint Cards AB_2 8,85 8,60 3%
First North Passive 2012 Invisio Communications AB 2,90 3,10 -7%
First North Passive 2012 Tethys Oil AB 44,60 40,00 10%
First North Passive 2013 Dignitana AB 17,80 15,00 16%
First North Passive 2013 Episurf Medical AB 61,25 34,50 44%
First North Passive 2014 Precio Systemutveckling AB 7,25 6,20 14%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Active 2009 Rottneros AB 6,79 4,50 34%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Active 2013 Active Biotech AB 54,00 45,00 17%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Active 2013 Moberg Derma AB 34,50 33,54 3%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Active 2014 Cavotec SA 27,30 26,50 3%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Active 2014 Karolinska Development AB 16,10 13,00 19%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Insider 2014 Karo Bio AB 1,08 0,47 56%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Passive 2010 BioInvent International AB 27,90 27,60 1%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Passive 2011 Fingerprint Cards AB_1 8,00 7,00 13%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Passive 2012 Melker Schörling AB 181,90 203,00 -12%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Passive 2013 Aerocrine AB 12,00 11,00 8%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Passive 2013 NeuroVive Pharmaceutical AB 18,10 14,00 23%
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Passive 2014 Rejlers AB 103,00 94,50 8%
NGM Equity Insider 2011 Confidence International AB 0,02 0,02 -10%
NGM Equity Insider 2013 Paynova AB 0,41 0,37 10%
NGM Equity Passive 2009 Oasmia Pharmaceutical AB 23,85 25,00 -5%
Nordic MTF Active 2012 ExeoTech Invest AB 4,05 4,50 -11%
Nordic MTF Mixed 2010 Clean Oil Technology AB 0,84 0,85 -1%
Nordic MTF Passive 2012 NFO Drives AB 0,37 0,32 14%
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Appendix G: Calculation of Abnormal Returns adjusted for discounts 
 
Rebate adjuster = AR0+(Issued shares/Shares before issue) * ((P0-Issue price)/P-1) 
CARadj= CAR(-1,1)+Rebate adjuster  
Company Buyer # shares issued
# shares before 
placement
P-1 price 1 
day before 
event
P0 - price on 
event day
Issue 
price
Rebate 
adjuster
CAR 
(-1,1) CARadj
Lyyn AB Insider 2 000 000 23 374 357 100,00 35,00 50,00 -0,013 -91,9% -93,2%
AdOperator AB Active 262 069 1 755 000 2,38 2,38 1,90 0,030 -63,7% -60,7%
Thenberg & Kinde Fondkommission AB Mixed 2 934 000 15 890 982 0,12 0,12 0,31 -0,290 1,3% -27,7%
Star Vault AB Active 4 169 859 33 704 690 0,10 0,10 0,23 -0,161 -2,9% -19,0%
Cryptzone AB Active 200 000 000 862 575 916 44,43 50,77 85,00 -0,179 0,5% -17,4%
NeuroVive Pharmaceutical AB Passive 2 500 000 19 159 046 19,80 18,10 14,00 0,027 -15,7% -13,0%
Trig Media Group AB Active 127 250 000 708 000 000 0,73 0,73 1,26 -0,129 0,2% -12,7%
Beowulf Mining plc_2 Mixed 53 333 333 282 820 560 0,37 0,36 0,34 0,011 -13,0% -11,9%
World Class Seagull International AB_1 Insider 23 750 000 57 758 595 0,68 0,68 0,80 -0,073 -4,5% -11,7%
Karo Bio AB Insider 15 000 000 495 947 367 1,17 1,08 0,47 0,016 -12,5% -11,0%
Recyctec Holding AB Active 60 500 10 954 620 10,10 10,05 10,79 0,000 -9,1% -9,1%
World Class Seagull International AB_2 Active 13 214 286 44 544 310 1,14 1,12 1,40 -0,073 -1,1% -8,4%
Africa Oil Corporation Passive 30 000 000 229 099 162 56,25 55,50 52,59 0,007 -8,2% -7,6%
Selena Oil & Gas Holding AB Mixed 1 600 000 41 347 500 9,60 9,20 5,00 0,017 -7,3% -5,6%
Beowulf Mining plc_1 Active 66 190 476 175 800 289 0,68 0,67 0,63 0,022 -7,5% -5,3%
EasyFill AB Insider 3 138 889 38 784 329 1,47 1,37 1,80 -0,024 -2,8% -5,2%
Paynova AB Insider 8 000 000 87 049 545 0,39 0,41 0,37 0,009 -6,1% -5,1%
ExeoTech Invest AB Active 400 000 16 137 018 4,50 4,05 4,50 -0,002 -4,0% -4,3%
TracTechnology AB Passive 806 130 37 702 269 1,32 1,30 1,98 -0,011 -2,4% -3,6%
New Equity Venture International AB Active 165 000 1 276 507 17,00 16,70 20,00 -0,025 -0,5% -3,0%
Oasmia Pharmaceutical AB Passive 1 720 000 35 892 858 24,51 23,85 25,00 -0,002 -2,1% -2,4%
TrustBuddy International AB Active 8 000 000 72 000 000 0,96 1,00 1,10 -0,012 -1,1% -2,3%
Hammar Invest AB Active 29 200 000 581 092 254 0,27 0,31 0,25 0,011 -3,1% -2,0%
Episurf Medical AB Passive 144 928 3 452 783 61,50 61,25 34,50 0,018 -3,1% -1,2%
Invisio Communications AB Passive 2 500 000 33 783 784 3,00 2,90 3,10 -0,005 -0,6% -1,1%
Latvian Forest Company AB Passive 412 037 5 061 649 6,67 6,62 6,65 0,000 -0,4% -0,4%
Dignitana AB Passive 900 000 10 778 645 16,60 17,80 15,00 0,014 -1,5% -0,1%
Skåne-möllan AB Active 100 000 1 000 000 370,00 370,00 360,00 0,003 -0,2% 0,1%
CybAero AB Insider 2 500 000 26 964 238 0,93 0,92 1,00 -0,008 1,0% 0,2%
BioInvent International AB Passive 5 434 800 55 660 889 28,80 27,90 27,60 0,001 0,3% 0,4%
Melker Schörling AB Passive 615 764 118 481 831 182,50 181,90 203,00 -0,001 0,8% 0,7%
Botnia Exploration AB Active 11 330 000 49 206 093 0,57 0,58 0,55 0,012 -0,3% 0,9%
Precio Systemutveckling AB Passive 400 000 7 489 546 7,90 7,25 6,20 0,007 0,5% 1,2%
Clean Oil Technology AB Mixed 20 000 000 56 907 158 0,85 0,84 0,85 -0,004 2,5% 2,1%
Aerocrine AB Passive 8 625 000 145 956 405 11,35 12,00 11,00 0,005 1,7% 2,3%
Tethys Oil AB Passive 2 500 000 32 543 750 44,50 44,60 40,00 0,008 2,1% 2,9%
Rejlers AB Passive 900 000 11 421 721 100,50 103,00 94,50 0,007 2,3% 2,9%
Mobile Loyalty Holding AB Passive 14 750 000 77 105 542 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,000 3,6% 3,6%
NFO Drives AB Passive 18 500 000 138 250 210 0,35 0,37 0,32 0,019 2,3% 4,2%
Fingerprint Cards AB_1 Passive 4 000 000 39 669 586 7,85 8,00 7,00 0,013 3,3% 4,6%
Moberg Derma AB Active 1 080 000 10 812 572 32,30 34,50 33,54 0,003 5,2% 5,5%
Deflamo AB Passive 2 272 727 34 086 516 9,69 10,15 11,00 -0,006 6,4% 5,8%
Heart of Brands AB Active 1 250 000 22 770 677 0,36 0,36 0,30 0,009 5,4% 6,3%
Respiratorius AB Active 15 000 000 106 708 423 0,63 0,67 0,60 0,016 4,8% 6,4%
Fingerprint Cards AB_2 Passive 4 197 674 43 609 586 8,60 8,85 8,60 0,003 6,2% 6,5%
Dome Energy AB Active 2 000 000 17 234 745 11,90 13,00 11,50 0,015 8,0% 9,4%
Confidence International AB Insider 414 815 4 203 846 0,02 0,02 0,02 -0,010 12,6% 11,7%
Brighter AB Active 3 571 429 11 897 480 15,97 15,13 7,00 0,153 -1,8% 13,5%
Cavotec SA Active 7 138 780 71 397 220 22,00 27,30 26,50 0,004 16,9% 17,3%
Xtranet Gruppen i Stockholm AB Mixed 1 860 000 5 212 692 1,00 0,87 1,00 -0,046 24,5% 19,9%
Active Biotech AB Active 6 000 000 68 923 582 48,80 54,00 45,00 0,016 19,3% 20,9%
Mineral Invest International MII AB Active 478 333 333 478 333 333 0,32 0,31 0,24 0,219 -0,4% 21,5%
Vinovo AB Active 4 362 640 43 626 400 2,80 3,25 3,25 0,000 23,1% 23,1%
Karolinska Development AB Active 4 846 154 48 538 404 13,60 16,10 13,00 0,023 22,6% 24,9%
Rottneros AB Active 444 444 444 1 089 494 425 5,94 6,79 4,50 0,157 10,6% 26,4%
Eurocine Vaccines AB Active 1 176 371 11 899 539 6,74 8,43 6,50 0,028 26,0% 28,9%
SRAB Shipping AB Mixed 6 600 000 000 6 454 546 000 20,00 10,00 5,00 0,256 7,1% 32,6%
Cws Comfort Window System AB Passive 300 000 5 688 200 2,75 4,90 6,80 -0,036 40,4% 36,7%
Altero AB Active 4 674 999 26 436 122 0,12 0,17 0,15 0,030 35,0% 38,0%
Amnode AB Insider 666 667 4 951 717 2,63 2,63 3,00 -0,019 42,8% 40,9%
VJ Since 1890 Sverige AB Passive 2 500 000 128 550 000 0,12 0,17 0,10 0,011 46,9% 48,0%
Net Gaming Europe AB Active 6 666 667 12 514 802 0,26 0,42 0,33 0,183 48,7% 66,9%
Mavshack AB Mixed 199 900 000 148 149 206 0,58 0,78 0,54 0,558 29,2% 85,0%
MedicPen AB Passive 8 500 000 40 476 190 0,90 1,94 0,60 0,313 94,5% 125,8%
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Appendix H: Excluded outliers 
 
Histogram and descriptive statistics 
0
4
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Series: CARadj
Sample 1 64
Observations 64
Mean            6,29%
Median       1,05%
Maximum   125,75%
Minimum      -93,21%
Std. Dev.   0,289
Skewness   0,820
Kurtosis   8,859
Jarque-Bera  98,72
Probability  0,000
 
The outliers are defined as an issue that deviates more than two standard deviations (outside 
95% of observation) from the mean of the sample. The calculations for the limits are shown in 
the table below. 
 
Based in the CARadj results in appendix F it results in that the following events are defined as 
outliers and due to that excluded from the sample. 
 
  
Outlier calculation
Mean 6,29%
1 standard deviation 28,92%
2 standard deviations 57,83%
Upper limit of CARadj 64,13%
Lower limit of CARadj -51,54%
Company CARadj
Lyyn AB -93,2%
AdOperator AB -60,7%
Net Gaming Europe AB 66,9%
Mavshack AB 85,0%
MedicPen AB 125,8%
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Appendix I: Correcting standard errors to mitigate heteroskedasticity 
 
Dependent Variable: CARadj  
Method: Least  squares   
Sample: 1 59 Included 
observations: 59    
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INSIDER_BUYER -0.032727 0.091013 -0.359584 0.7206 
ACTIVE_BUYER 0.022972 0.046309 0.496062 0.6219 
LN_ISSUE_SIZE -0.010833 0.019384 -0.558887 0.5786 
LN_ISSUE_DIV_FIR
M_SIZE 0.018323 0.024291 0.754319 0.4541 
REG_MARKET 0.049099 0.052341 0.938071 0.3525 
FIN_RESTR -0.002975 0.049397 -0.060222 0.9522 
INTERCEPT 0.098440 0.107157 0.918649 0.3625 
     
     R-squared 0.028331    Mean dependent var 0.047309 
Adjusted R-squared -0.083785    S.D. dependent var 0.155416 
S.E. of regression 0.161796    Akaike info criterion -0.693971 
Sum squared resid 1.361247    Schwarz criterion -0.447483 
Log likelihood 27.47214    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.597752 
F-statistic 0.252690    Durbin-Watson stat 2.129812 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.956029    Wald F-statistic 0.288879 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.939622    
     
      
 
